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CASE COMMENTS
CORPORATIONS-GREEMENT BETWEEN PARENT AND SUB-
SIDIARY COItP01ATIoNs FOR ALLOCATION Or INCoME TAX SAVINGS
RESULTING FROM FILING CONSOLIDATED RETURNS HELD "NOT
FAnt"
By filing consolidated income tax returns l offsetting parent's operat-
ing loss against subsidiary's profit, subsidiary corporation was relieved of
$3,825,717.43 in taxes; parent corporation realized tax savings through
the consolidated return by the elimination of tax on intercorporate divi-
dends.2 Prior to the purchase by parent of the additional stock in sub-
sidiary necessary to qualify 3 for consolidated filing, the directors of sub-
sidiary, all but one of whom were connected with parent,4 approved an
agreement 5 allocating all but $268,725.28 6 of the contemplated tax saving
to parent.7 Minority shareholders of subsidiary corporation brought suit
to recover the payments to parent corporation. At the time the agreement
was made, parent's business outlook indicated profitable operations,8 the
amount of profit being dependent upon the amount of accelerated deprecia-
tion and amortization it might elect to take now instead of in the future.9
Under a perpetual lease arrangement with parent, subsidiary had a "prac-
tically guaranteed taxable income into the indefinite future." 10 With two
justices dissenting, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
1 IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1501-04.
2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1504.
3 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1504(a) requires eighty percent ownership of subsidi-
ary's stock by the parent company to qualify to file a consolidated income tax return.
4 Technically, the directorates of the parent and subsidiary were not interlocking
since none of the directors of the subsidiary were directors of the parent. However,
all but one of subsidiary's directors were officers of either the parent or of another
of its affiliates. The law governing interlocking directorates and interested directors
covers this situation. See 3 FLErcHER, CYcLoPEDIA CoaoRATxioNs § 945 (rev. vol.
1947) [hereinafter cited as FLETcHER].
5This agreement included thirty-four other affiliated companies. The agreement
provided: (1) savings resulting from the elimination of tax on intercompany divi-
dends were to be shared exclusively by the members of the affiliated group which
had taxable income (profit companies) irrespective of whether they received any
such dividends; (2) profit companies were to reimburse loss companies to the extent
their taxes were reduced by offsetting losses of loss companies against the profit com-
panies' taxable income; (3) this reimbursement was to be made at the end of the
year following the year in which the taxable income was earned; (4) in no event
would any member have to pay more than it would have had to pay in taxes if it
had filed a separate return. Brief for Appellee, pp. 11-12.
GThis amount is the same as the savings from the elimination of tax on inter-
corporate dividends.
7 Parent's officers testified that acceptance of the allocation agreement by the
subsidiary was the inducement to parent to purchase additional shares in subsidiary
so as to qualify for consolidated tax returns. Brief for Appellee, p. 13.
8Id. at 16.
9 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 167(b), 167(e), 174(b).
10 Instant case at 384, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
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reversing the trial court, held that the allocation agreement was "not fair,"
and ordered parent to account for all sums received from subsidiary
pursuant to the allocation agreement. Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 19
App. Div. 2d 383, 243 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1963).
Some opportunity to void transactions between corporations with
interlocking directorates 1 is necessary because of the danger that con-
flicting interests in such transactions 12 will prejudice minority shareholders.
Recognizing the legitimate purposes served by intercorporate links, 3 courts
hold that contracts between such companies are not voidable by the cor-
poration at will, but only if "unfair." 14 "The essence of the test is whether
or not . . . the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's length
bargain." 15 The burden of proving fairness is usually placed on the
proponent of the transaction.:6
In the present case the court did not confront the question of what
distribution, if any, would be fair; it simply held that as the agreement
allocating tax savings was unfair, all payments received by the parent were
to be returned.' 7  In Alliegro v. Pan Am. Bank,'8 the court did reach
this issue 19 and held that payment by the profit subsidiary to the loss
11 See note 4 supra.
12 See, e.g., Mayflower Hotel Stockholders Protective Comm. v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp., 193 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1951) ; Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d
18 (1942) ; Sage v. Culver, 147 N.Y. 241, 247, 41 N.E. 513, 514 (1895). See generally
Note, The Fairness Test of Corporate Contracts With Interested Directors, 61 HARv.
L. REv. 335 (1948); Note, 42 ORE. L. REv. 61 (1962).
13 See Corsicana Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68 (1919); Chelrob, Inc. v.
Barrett, 293 N.Y. 442, 57 N.E.2d 825 (1944); 3 FLETcHm §§ 961-62; Note, 51 HARV.
L. REV. 327 (1937) ; Note, The Effect of Common Officers in Intercorporate Trans-
actions, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 598 (1933).
14 E.g., Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 203 F.2d 279 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 866 (1953); Montgomery Traction Co. v. Harmon, 140 Ala. 505,
520, 37 So. 371, 375 (1904) (parent-subsidiary relationship) ; Everett v. Phillips, 228
N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942) (common officers); Bowman v. Gum, Inc., 327 Pa.
403, 193 Atl. 271 (1937) (interlocking directorates). Contra, e.g., Colorado Manage-
ment Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 145 Colo. 413, 359 P.2d 665 (1961) ;
Barnes v. Atlantic Cement Prods., Inc., 39 N.Y.S.2d 699 (Sup. Ct. 1942). "This
rule removes all temptation . . . and relieves a court from determining the fairness
or reasonableness of the transaction, the influences that might have been present to
encourage it, [and] the motives of the directors who voted for it . . . . Its main value
is certainty." LATriN, CORPORATIONS 258 (1959) [hereinafter cited as LAI-rIN].
Many variations and limitations have been made upon the "voidable only if unfair"
rule. See 3 FLETCHER §§ 945, 961-62; Note, The Fairness Test of Corporate Con-
tracts With Interested Directors, 61 HARv. L. REv. 335 (1948); Note, The Effect
of Common Officers in Intercorporate Transactions, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 598 (1933).
15 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939).
16 See DODD & BAKER, CASES ON CORPORATIONS 474-76 (2d ed. 1951) ; 3 FLETCHER
§ 974; Note, Burden of Proof on Directors To Show Fairness of Transactions Be-
tween Corporations With Common Directors, 10 DE PAUL L. REV. 185 (1960). But
see Note, The Fairness Test of Corporate Contracts With Interested Directors, 61
HARv. L. REv. 335 (1948).
'7 Instant case at 387-88, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
Is 136 So. 2d 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962), aff'd, 149 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1963).
19 In Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 85 F. Supp. 868 (N.D.
Cal. 1949), aff'd and petition for rehearing en banc denied, 197 F.2d 994 (9th Cir.
1951), rev'd and remanded for reconsideration of denial of petition for rehearing en
banc, 345 U.S. 247, referred to division, 205 F.2d 374 (9th Cir.), rehearing denied,
206 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1953), this issue was reached under different circumstances.
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parent of any part of the tax savings resulting from offsetting parent's loss
against subsidiary's profit constituted an illegal preferential dividend.2 °
This concept fails to recognize that a loss, because of its tax saving potential,
is a valuable asset.2 As the first step in allocating the tax savings, each
corporation should receive a portion equal to the value of what it relin-
quished in consenting to the consolidated return. A present operating loss
may be applied against prior or subsequent income to reduce taxable income
in those years 2 2  The loss is of great value to the corporation if it has
prospects of profitable operations in the immediate future so that profits
can be offset,- or when a current loss is primarily due to the taking
of deductions which could be delayed until there is taxable income.2 A
profit, on the other hand, is valuable only in that the tax savings arise
from offsetting losses against it. Its extrinsic value is therefore not com-
parable to the loss, it being merely the sine qua non to the ripening of the
value of the loss.
In the present case, by filing a consolidated return, the parent relin-
quished the present value of utilizing its loss in later years; since it had
prospects of profitable operations within the five year carryover period, and
the present loss was due primarily to taking income deductions which could
have been taken in the future, the value of the operating loss to the parent
itself was substantial. Subsidiary relinquished an asset only to the extent
that potential future losses might not be utilized because no present profit
remained to be offset. However, as subsidiary had a "practically guaranteed
taxable income into the indefinite future," its profit had no value to the
subsidiary itself as a sine qua non, so that by consenting to the consolidated
return, it gave up nothing for which it must be compensated out of the
total tax savings.
However, consolidated returns were filed only because the total tax
saving to the consolidated enterprise would be greater than the value to
themselves of the gains and losses relinquished by the participants. This
increment in savings represents a "bonus" which must be allocated to the
participating corporations after compensation for the value of that which
Subsidiary underwent reorganization wherein parent's shares were declared worthless,
thus barring parent from participating in the reorganization. Subsequently, while still
nominally affiliated, a consolidated return was filed whereby parent offset its loss
from subsidiary's stock against subsidiary's profits earned under reorganization trus-
tees. Parent brought suit to recover these tax savings, alleging that the filing of the
consolidated return and thus the savings to subsidiary were caused by subsidiary's
dominance over the common officers. Recovery was denied.
20The Florida court relied upon Beneficial Corp. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 396
(1952), aff'd per curiam, 202 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1953).
21 See Arent, Tax Aspects of Buying Loss Corporations Under the 1954 Code,
33 TAXES 955 (1955) ; Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 1,
15-16 (1956) ; Rudick, Acquisitions To Avoid Income or Excess Profits Tax: Sec-
tion 129 of the Internal Revenue Code, 58 HARv. L. REv. 196 (1944).
22 INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 172(b). A loss may be carried back two years and
forward five years.
23 At 1963 tax rates, this value would be $.52 on every dollar of loss, discounted
at a rate reflecting the current cost of capital (interest rate) and the probability of
having profits against which to offset the current loss.
24 See IN r. Rzv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 167(b)-(c), 168, 174(b).
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each relinquished. The court in the present case suggested that the proper
allocation would be that resulting if the corporations had held independent
bargaining positions- 5 -the amount each would demand in return for its
consent to file a consolidated return with that company instead of some
other company.2 6 Yet, under this approach, with the law of supply and
demand determining the distribution, the loss company would receive a far
greater share 2 7 since profit companies are typical and loss companies the
exception. In fact, because of the great difficulty in determining with any
precision what result would flow from independent bargaining, the great
disparity 28 in bargaining positions might justify giving the entire bonus
to the loss company.29 The court stated that parent corporation had a duty
2 5 Instant case at 386, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
2
6In Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247 (1953),
the parent had an operating loss, but prior to the year in which a consolidated return
was filed, subsidiary had frequently had losses. Justice Jackson, dissenting from the
Court's determination of only a procedural issue, commented:
Each corporation . . . had a bargaining position. . . . It was as if a
treasure . . . were offered . . . to whoever might have two keys that would
unlock it. Each of these two parties had but one key [one-profit--one-loss],
and how can it be said that the holder of the other key [profit] had nothing
worth bargaining for?
Id. at 277.
27 Since subsidiary was the profit company in the present case, by filing consoli-
dated returns parent realizes additional savings in that no income tax is paid on any
dividends received from subsidiary, whereas if no consolidated return were filed,
parent would have to pay tax on fifteen percent of such dividends. INT. RE:v. CoDE
oF 1954, §§ 243(a), 1503(a). This extra savings realized by parent, however, should
not affect the allocation of the bonus under an independent bargaining standard, as
the allocation is determined solely by the relative scarcity of a loss and of a profit.
28 In the usual situation the profit company gives up nothing by consenting,
since it would be a rare situation if a company with present profits had prospects of
losses within the next two years continuing for more than five years so as to not
be within the carryover-carryback provisions of the code.
29 If this were done in the present case, the loss company would receive the
entire savings since only it gave up an asset which had to be compensated in ihe first
stage of allocation. "Indeed, it is probable that the intention of the statute permitting
the consolidation of the two positions was to provide salvage for the loser, not profit
for the one which sustained no loss." Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac.
R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 277 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting from Court's determination
of only a procedural point). But see note 25 supra.
Another possible allocation would be to allocate the entire bonus to the profit
company which in fact "realized" the tax savings. See Western Pac. R-R. Corp. v.
Western Pac. R.R. Co., 206 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1953); Alliegro v. Pan Am. Bank,
136 So. 2d 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962), aff'd, 149 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1963). However,
this seems a purely mechanical basis for decision.
Applying the court's hypothetical independent bargaining standard, the allocation
agreement in the present case seems fair to subsidiary. Subsidiary received $268,725.28
whereas it gave up nothing of value by consenting. As subsidiary was entirely de-
pendent upon parent for its income, it was to subsidiary's interest that parent should
continue to be in a position to pay the rent called for in the lease. Subsidiary was
able, through the consolidated return, to strengthen parent financially without any
loss or injury to itself. Instant case at 389, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 626 (dissenting opinion).
Parent received $3,556,992.15, but relinquished the use of its loss in future years to
secure tax savings for itself. Discounted at three percent for three years the value
of what it gave up would be $3,501,073.40 assuming ample profits. See text accom-
panying notes 23-24 supra. Subsidiary also was permitted to use the tax savings
interest-free for one year. For the period in issue, this use of capital at three percent
was worth $91,916.98. Brief for Appellee, p. 15. In addition subsidiary incurred no
expenditure similar to parent's investment of funds in additional stock of subsidiary
to enable the companies to file a consolidated return.
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to its shareholders to increase its investment in subsidiary to the requisite
eighty percent and file a consolidated return.3 0 In the abstract a controlling
shareholder has no obligation to give any of its assets to the corporation.'
It would be possible to impose this duty only if parent's eighty percent
share of the tax savings to subsidiary which were produced by parent giving
its tax loss to subsidiary exceeded the prospective value of parent's operat-
ing loss to itself.32 Even then, the fact that parent would because of its
ownership participate in whatever benefit accrued to the subsidiary should
be irrelevant to the question of allocation. If a controlling shareholder
sells an asset to the corporation, the fact that he will receive a major part
of the profit it generates for the corporation does not preclude him from
receiving payment for the asset relinquished, including a fair profit from
the transaction.m3 The fact that parent will receive some benefit from the
consolidated return does not mean that subsidiary is entitled to all the excess
benefits from consolidation; subsidiary has the same duty to its share-
holders to consent if it would gain from the transaction. Furthermore,
with the focus on bargaining positions determined by the value of the
assets held by the participating corporations, it should make no difference
whether the loss company is the parent or the subsidiary.
While the court spoke in terms of independent bargaining, eighty
percent ownership of subsidiary is required to file a consolidated return,
so that this type of allocation agreement is necessarily entered into by com-
panies which are not independent. The agreement is often the culmination
of action by the parent pursuant to a unilateral decision to obtain the
benefits of a consolidated return. In the present case parent corporation
had controlled subsidiary prior to the plan to consolidate. Since parent
initiated the tax saving action and invested the amount necessary to in-
crease its holdings to eighty percent, it would seem reasonable to allocate
the entire bonus to it. This applies whether parent was the profit or the
loss company; 3 4 it has the role of the entrepreneur, who normally would
3 0 Instant case at 387, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 624. See also Western Pac. R.R. Corp.
v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 206 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1953).
31 See Duke Power Co. v. Commissioner, 44 F.2d 543, 545 (4th Cir. 1930);
LArN 251. But see Western Pac. R.1. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 197 F.2d
994, 1004 (9th Cir. 1951).
32 In the present case, if there were no allocation agreements, parent would
receive eighty percent of the tax savings as an eighty percent shareholder
($3,060,573.94) plus the savings from the elimination of tax on intercorporate divi-
dends ($268,725.28) (total $3,329,299.22). To this would be compared the present
value of the same tax savings by applying its present tax loss against prospective
future earnings (e.g., $3,825,716.43 realized three years later discounted at three
percent would be $3,501,073.40). Thus, in the absence of an allocation agreement,
the desirability of filing a consolidated return could depend upon the discount rate
plus the probability of future profits against which the loss would be offset.
33 See 3 FLETCHER §§ 931, 950; LATriN 251. In this situation the value of the
asset would be the market value. But when there is no market value because it
cannot be sold, the value can only be the loss of benefit by relinquishing the asset.
See text accompanying notes 20-24 supra.
3
4 Thus, if parent was the loss company and subsidiary had no prospective losses,
parent would receive the entire tax savings, see note 28 supra; if subsidiary was the
loss company, it would be compensated only for the value relinquished, see text
accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
19641
1190 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112
be permitted to retain any profits (bonus) received from a venture (con-
solidated return) undertaken by it, after compensating subsidiary for any
value relinquished by subsidiary in consenting.35
The general doctrine that controlling shareholders may not use their
position to derive a personal benefit not shared equally by all shareholders-
any such gain belonging to the corporation 3 Q-should not be applicable
to the present situation. Modern courts do not apply this concept as a
prophylactic rule to prevent all dealings between controlling shareholders
and corporations. As mentioned above, the rule does not apply to normal
sales in the course of business between a controlling shareholder and the
company.3 7 Furthermore, a distinction should be made between benefits
secured by a shareholder because of his position which do not 38 and those
which do deprive the corporation of a business opportunity,39 or deplete
its assets.4 ° Excepting those cases in which the transaction was conducted
secretly or resulted from use of secret information, the broad rule generally
appears to have been limited to the latter instances.4 The mere fact that a
director obtains information of a business opportunity through his position
does not preclude him from profiting from it if the corporation with full
knowledge is unable or unwilling to pursue the opportunity.42 In the pres-
ent case subsidiary was in no way injured and lost no benefit; the fact that
parent profited because of its relationship is no reason to permit subsidiary
to share in the bonus savings. When subsidiary is able to sell its consent to
35 As eighty percent ownership is required to file a consolidated return, there
can be no market value for the use of a company's profit or loss. Hence, the value
for which the subsidiary is compensated is only the value to itself for future tax
savings purposes. See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
36 See, e.g., Higgins v. Shenango Pottery Co., 256 F.2d 504, 508 (3d Cir. 1958);
In re Van Sweringen Co., 119 F.2d 231, 235 (6th Cir. 1941) ; Bailey v. Jacobs, 325
Pa. 187, 194, 189 Atl. 320, 324 (1937) ; 3 FLETcHiER §§ 838, 884; LAT TN 251.
37 See text accompanying note 33 supra.
3 8 LArrTiN 251 n.37.
39 E.g., Newv York Trust Co. v. American Realty Co., 244 N.Y. 209, 155 N.E.
102 (1926); Lutherland, Inc. v. Dahlen, 357 Pa. 143, 53 A.2d 143 (1947). See also
3 FLETcira § 884; LATTiN 250-57.
4 0 E.g., Cathedral Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1955).
4 1 E.g., Higgins v. Shenango Pottery Co., 256 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1958) ; Gamlen
Chem. Co. v. Gamlen, 79 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Pa. 1948) ; Brophy v. Cities Service Co.,
70 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949). Compare Young v. Columbia Oil Co., 110 W. Va. 364,
374, 158 S.E. 678, 682 (1931).
In Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955), the court held that a controlling shareholder who receives a premium for
his stock, because with it went control and the right to elect new directors upon the
simultaneous seriatim resignation of controlling shareholder's own board, was account-
able to minority shareholders for the premium. Although the sale did not injure
the corporation, the court viewed the premium as proceeds from the sale of an asset
belonging to the corporation-control. The court suggested that the result rested upon
the fact that this price had not been made available to all shareholders and, in the par-
ticular circumstances, the corporation was injured. In the present case the share-
holder (parent) is not selling any corporate asset without compensating the company.
42 Cf. Zeckendorf v. Steinfeld, 12 Ariz. 245, 262, 100 Pac. 784, 790 (1909),
modified, 225 U.S. 445 (1912) ; Blaustein v. Pan Am. Petroleum & Transp. Co., 293
N.Y. 281, 56 N.E.2d 705 (1944).
The difficulty in determining the value of what the corporation relinquished should
not justify a prophylactic rule.
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a consolidated return only because of parent's act of investing in the req-
uisite stock, it is reasonable to regard its consent as a raw material for
which parent need pay only to the extent of the value relinquished by
subsidiary,43 whether it is the profit or loss company.
Regardless of whether an independent bargaining or entrepreneurial
theory of allocating the bonus is adopted, and even if both are rejected, the
court's decision requiring parent to account for all sums received from
subsidiary under the allocation agreement is improper. The agreement is
inseparable from parent's purchase of the additional stock in subsidiary and
its consent to file a consolidated return.4 An "unfair" agreement justifies,
at most, allowing the subsidiary to have the entire bonus. The parent's role
as a shareholder is separate from its position as the "seller" of an asset,
so that under no circumstances should it have been required to account for
more than the amount it received in excess of fair compensation for the
value to it of its operating loss.
4 5
FEDERAL COURTS-TAXATION-STATE PROBATE. CouRT
DECREE HELD "COLLUSIVE" AND NOT BINDING ON FEDERAL CouRT
IN TAx PROCEEDING
Decedent's will left an interest in the residue of his estate to his widow,
who claimed the interest was a fee simple and therefore qualified for a
marital deduction.' The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, however, ruled
that she had received only a life estate which did not qualify.2 The widow's
attorney apparently obtained the local probate judge's agreement that the
estate was a fee simple,3 and, after the Commissioner's ruling, the widow,
as coexecutor, filed a petition in the probate court for interpretation of the
will, requesting instructions for filing the federal estate tax return.4 Notice
was given to the heirs, will beneficiaries, and the state commissioner of
taxation, but only the widow and her lawyer, who represented both the
estate and her personally, appeared at the hearing. The hearing was short
43 See note 35 mtpra.
44 Parent may not withdraw the consolidated returns and file separately for the
years in issue so as to retain the potential tax savings for itself.
45 Cf. May v. Midwest Ref. Co., 121 F.2d 431 (1st Cir. 1941) ; Ripley v. Inter-
national Ry. of Cent. Am., 8 N.Y.2d 430, 171 N.E.2d 443, 209 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1960)
(parent must pay subsidiary difference between value of services received and the
amount paid for them). See also 65 HARv. L. REv. 1256 (1952).
1 INT. R.v. CODE OF 1954, § 2056.
2 She admittedly received a power of appointment but the Commissioner ruled
it did not comply with the deductibility standard of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b).
3 Instant case at 440 n.2, 446.
4 She had earlier filed a petition with the same court for extra time in which to
elect to take under the will or renounce, saying she did not know how the will would
be interpreted. Instant case at 440 n.3.
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and merely factual,5 and the attorney filed a brief which argued only for
the fee simple, although it did state the two possible interpretations of
the will. The probate court entered an order interpreting the interest as a
fee simple, and, subsequently, the state tax was paid and a final decree of
distribution was entered on that basis.6 The estate took the marital deduc-
tion on its federal tax return, but the Commissioner determined a deficiency
and was upheld by the Tax Court.7 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed, holding that the state probate court's determination was
not binding because made by an inferior court in a "collusive" proceeding,
and that the state law, properly applied, gave the widow only a life estate
with limited power of appointment. The court of appeals based its finding
of "collusion" on the following facts: the attorney's conference with the
probate judge before filing the petition, the obvious predominance of the
federal tax motive, lack of notice of the hearing to the federal tax authorities,
representation of the widow by the estate counsel, lack of presentation to
the probate court of the opposing argument, and the incorrectness of the
probate court's decision under state law. Estate of Peyton v. Commissioner,
323 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1963).
Whether Congress conditions the incidence of a particular tax on a
state characterization,8 or bypasses state characterizations and sets up its
own definition of the property interest on the transfer or receipt of which
the tax is imposed,9 it is almost always state law which determines the
underlying substantive rights of persons in property.10 For example, state
law determines the extent of the powers included in a particular power of
appointment, although federal law decides whether it qualifies as a "general
5 The widow was the only witness, and she merely stated the issue and the fact
that she wanted an interpretation so that she could file the return. Instant case
at 440-41.
6 After the order was entered, the widow made no further effort to preserve her
right to elect against the will. It does not appear from the opinion of either the court
of appeals or the Tax Court whether the probate court's determination that the widow
took a fee simple affected the state inheritance tax, but the state commissioner of
taxation did not oppose her effort to have the will so interpreted.
721 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1111 (1962).
s The general rule is: "State law may control only when the federal taxing act,
by express language or necessary implication, makes its own operation dependent upon
state law." Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932). A notable example of
deference to state law is Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), in which the Court
held state community property law controlling in deciding whether income should be
taxed to husband or wife. See generally Stephens & Freeland, The Role of Local
Law and Local Adjudications in Federal Tax Controversies, 46 MINN. L. Rzv. 223,
224-34 (1961).
9 For example, the term "inheritance" is federally defined, Lyeth v. Hoey, 305
U.S. 188 (1938), and compensation for a child's personal services are included in
his gross income, regardless of state law as to who is entitled thereto, INT. Rxv. CODE
oF 1954, § 73(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.73-1(a) (1955). See generally Stephens & Free-
land, supra note 8, at 224-34.
10 The classic statement is: "State law creates legal interests and rights. The
federal revenue acts designate what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed."
Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940) (holding that "general power of
appointment" is federally defined).
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power of appointment" for tax purposes"- Given that state law determines
the underlying property rights, the present case involves a question one
level removed: when is a state court adjudication which purports to deter-
mine, according to state law, the property rights upon which a federal tax
depends, binding on the federal courts in subsequent tax litigation? The
Supreme Court last dealt with this question in Freuler v. Helvering ' 2 and
Blair v. Commissioner; 13 in both cases the Court rejected the Commis-
sioner's contention that the state adjudications involved were "collusive"
and held them binding. Since then the courts of appeals have assumed
that a finding of "collusion" leads to the opposite result, but have differed
widely over the meaning of that word.14 The Supreme Court has declined
to resolve the conflicts.'6
In Blair the Commissioner sought to tax the beneficiary of a testa-
mentary trust on income which he had assigned, contending that his assign-
ments were invalid under state law, because the trust was a spendthrift trust.
The Supreme Court held binding a decision that the assignments were valid
rendered by an Illinois intermediate appellate court on the trustees' petition
for interpretation of the will. The Court found no "basis for a charge that
the suit was collusive and the decree inoperative," 16 although the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had stated, "There is that which suggests
a friendly suit to avoid taxes, to which there was no opposition or adverse
party. . .. The suit was prosecuted only until a favorable decision was
reached and then no appeal was taken .... In other words it was not
unlike a consent decree." 17
At issue in Freuler was the effect of a California decision, on an ac-
count filed by the trustee, that the beneficiaries of a trust were not entitled
to income already distributed to them, because it should have been held in
the trust to cover depreciation. The Commissioner sought to tax the bene-
ficiaries on the income, under a code provision which made taxable to a
beneficiary income "which, pursuant to the instrument or order governing
the distribution, is distributable to such beneficiary .... ." 18 The Court
11Ibid. See also Strite v. McGinnes, 215 F. Supp. 513 (E.D. Pa. 1963), 112
U. PA. L. REv 141, aff'd, 2 CCH 1964 Fmu. EsT. & Gr. TAx REP. (64-1 U.S. Tax
Cas.) ff 12223 (3d Cir. March 31, 1964).
12291 U.S. 35 (1934).
13 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
14 Compare Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955) (en banc), and
Eisenmenger v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1944), with Estate of Faulker-
son v. United States, 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 887 (1962), and
Estate of Stallworth v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1958), revd on rehear-
ing on other grounds, id. at 767.
I1 See, e.g., Estate of Faulkerson v. United States, supra note 14; Estate of Sweet
v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 401 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956) ; Sauls-
bury v. United States, 199 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953);
Falk v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 806 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951).
16 300 U.S. at 10.
17 Commissioner v. Blair, 83 F.2d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 1936) (holding the state
decision binding anyway, but deciding against the taxpayer on other grounds).
18 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §219(d), 42 Stat. 246. Compare INT. REv.
CODE or 1954, §§ 641, 652(a).
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held that the state decision in question was the "order" to which the code
referred and under it the income was not "distributable." Its holding
also rested on the following statement:
[T]he decision of that [California] court, until reversed or
overruled, establishes the law of California respecting the distribu-
tion of the trust estate. It is none the less a declaration of the law
of the State because not based on a statute, or earlier decisions.
The rights of the beneficiaries are property rights and the court
has adjudicated them.19
The Court rejected the Commissioner's contention that the proceeding in the
state court was "collusive in the sense that all the parties joined in a sub-
mission of the issues and sought a decision which would adversely affect the
Government's right to additional income tax." 20
Justices Brandeis and Stone joined in a dissent by Justice Cardozo 21
based on the fact that the state court had allowed the beneficiaries to satisfy
its order by merely giving their promissory notes payable without interest
at the termination of the trust. They argued that the value of the notes
was substantially less than the value of the income received and sought
to be taxed, and contended that since the nontax incident of the state court
order was limited to the value of the notes, it was binding only to that
extent.
22
There are two senses in which a state court decision is said to be
binding. First, when a state decision establishes the property rights in-
volved in the federal tax litigation, the federal court has no power to review
the state decision. 3 Second, even though the state decision does not deter-
mine those property rights, when it does constitute a declaration of the state
19 291 U.S. at 45.
20 Ibid.
21 Id. at 47-52. The dissenters assumed "for present purposes" the lack of fraud
or collusion in the state court proceedings. Id. at 47.
22 The dissent would have sustained the Commissioner's assessment completely,
but only because the taxpayer had failed to satisfy his burden of proving the precise
extent of the Commissioner's error. Id. at 51.
23 Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 1955) (en banc), misapplied
the principle, see note 39 infra, but stated the rationale succinctly:
This is because the right to the income or other property sought to be taxed
is created solely by state law. . . . An adjudication of such a question of
title by a court of the state must accordingly be given effect, not because it is
res judicata against the United States, but because it is conclusive of the
parties' property rights which alone are to be taxed. So far as those parties
are concerned the law of the state is what the state court has declared and
applied in their case. If the state court's judgment has binding final effect
under the state law the rights of the parties can only be what the court has
held them to be.
See, e.g., 1 MERTENS, FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 10.23, at 676 (1959);
10 MERTENS, FED m L INcOmE TAXATION § 61.03 (Zimet rev. 1958) ; 1 PAUL, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND Gn=v TAXATION § 1.11, at 73 (1942) ; Oliver, The Nature of the Compul-
sive Effect of State Law in Federal Tax Proceedings, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 638, 663-64
(1953).
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law with respect to them, it will generally be held "binding." 24 The dissent
in Freuler recognizes and applies the principle that the federal courts have
the power to make their own determination of state law to the extent that
the state decision does not actually affect property rights.2 5 Only that
part of the state court decision which establishes property rights is a limit
on the ultimate power of the federal courts.
Applying this principle to the present case, the state court decision
is binding, as a limit on the power of the federal courts, to the extent of its
incidents-the widow's title in fee simple to the property. This incident,
however, is a fee simple only from the time of the decision; the decision
had no actual effect on the status of the property before it was rendered.
2 6
The federal marital deduction depends solely on the title she received from
her husband 27 not that received from the court decision. Therefore, the
federal court has the power to interpret the will differently.
28
24 See, e.g., Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); Freuler v. Helvering,
291 U.S. 35 (1934).
25 The Blair opinion seems implicitly to recognize that the Court had the power
itself to reexamine the state law, without having to follow the state court decision;
it says only that such an independent examination "would be wholly unwarranted in
the exercise of federal jurisdiction." 300 U.S. at 10.
The principle which would justify the federal courts' independent examination
of state law in these cases is the same as that which justified the Supreme Court's
review in Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938). In that case the
Indiana legislature had repealed a teacher tenure law and then a teacher had been
discharged without the procedural steps which had been guaranteed by the law. The
teacher brought suit in the state courts for reinstatement, contending that the repealing
act was a law impairing the obligation of contracts in violation of the federal con-
stitution. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the tenure law and the actions of
the schools and the teacher under it did not constitute a contract Although it con-
ceded that the question whether there had been a contract was one of state law, the
United States Supreme Court nevertheless made its own investigation of the state
law to discover that in fact there had been a contract. The justification for this
action is that the state court's declaration that there had been no contract had no
incidents other than to affect the federal claim. See HART & WEcHSLER, THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 465-67 (1953).
26 Cf. United States v. Mappes, 318 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1963), in which the
decedent left his wife a fee simple in his residuary estate but provided that the property
should go to his sons "in the event that my wife . . . should die before my estate
has been administered." The court of appeals held that the interest which passed to
the wife was terminable within the meaning of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (1),
and the estate was therefore not entitled to the marital deduction. The court refused
to give conclusive effect to a probate court decree awarding the widow a fee simple
interest in the property. It noted that its job was to "determine the nature and extent
of the interest which passed at the instant of the testator's death, not the interest given
by the decree of the Probate Court." 318 F.2d at 510.2 7 Exceptions to this statement occur when the surviving spouse elects to take a
statutory share and in the situation provided for by INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056
(b) (3), allowing a marital deduction for an interest which will terminate in the
event that the surviving spouse dies within six months of the decedent or as a result
of a common disaster, provided the condition does not in fact occur.
28United States v. Mappes, 318 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1963). It is suggested by
one writer that the same result could be obtained by viewing the will as leaving the
widow only a life estate and the suit for construction of the will as a mechanism by
which the remaindermen released their interests, leaving the widow with a fee simple.
76 HARv. L. Rxv. 644, 647 (1963) (commenting on the Tax Court decision in the
instant case). Such an approach implicitly recognizes the fundamental point that the
state court decision did not actually establish the property right at issue in the tax
litigation, although the writer seems to say that it actually did establish it. Id. at 646.
Since it is an incident of the state court decision in the present case that the
widow receive a fee simple in the property from the time of the decision, so that she
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Under this analysis the federal courts have the power to refuse to be
bound by any state decision rendered after the date when the federal tax
liability allegedly was incurred.2 Freuler and Blair, however, hold that
the federal courts will still be "bound" by the state decision in most cir-
cumstances.3 0 Three reasons can be given: (1) the interest in federal-
state comity; 3 1 (2) the unjust placement of the tax which might result
from a refusal to follow the state adjudication which has actually determined
the rights of the parties in the property from the time of the decision; 32
and (3) the likelihood that the state judge is more conversant with and thus
better equipped to determine state law than a federal judge.3 3 Weighing
against these considerations are the likelihood that the local judge will tend
to favor the taxpayer, 34 the Government's interest in protecting its revenues,
and the public's concern that the tax statutes be applied evenhandedly. 5
To the extent that a taxpayer in one area can obtain more favorable treat-
ment from his local judiciary in "deciding" his property rights than a
taxpayer elsewhere, the Government's revenues are reduced and the tax
burden is maldistributed.
If the state court has in fact exercised its presumed expertise and ac-
tually considered the state law question, there would seem to be little danger
to the interests of the Government and public 3 6 However, if the state
is able to exercise full dominion over it from that time, the property will be included
in her gross estate for tax purposes, absent a previous disposition of it. This result
may seem inequitable, as the court has held that her husband's estate may not take
a marital deduction. The proper explanation, however, is that she has succeeded in
enlarging her estate at a time after the husband's death, whether by gift from the
remaindermen or by operation of law to change her interest. Therefore, it is not
inconsistent to say that she did not receive the fee simple from her husband but she
does own it at her death.
2 9 Any such case would be subject to the same analysis as that described for the
present case. One example is Eisenmenger v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 103 (8th Cir.
1944), which involved a question whether income received by a trust in the form of
deferred debenture notes was distributable to the beneficiary. The trustees had kept
the notes, and the beneficiary had not reported them as income, but the Commissioner
assessed a deficiency. Ruling on the trustees' petition for construction of the trust
instrument, the state court held that the notes were not distributable. Under the
analysis described above, the federal court had the power independently to examine
state law in deciding on tax liability for income earned before the state decision. The
state court decision did conclusively establish the right to income to be received in
the future. Therefore, the federal courts would be absolutely bound if a question
arose as to that income.
30 Both of these cases involved state court decisions rendered after the income
in question had been earned. Thus, it would be consistent with those decisions in
both cases to hold that the taxpayers in question were taxable thereon. See note
25 supra.
31 Cf. Commissioner v. Blair, 300 U.S. 5, 10 (1937) ; Oliver, supra note 23, at 665.
32 See Colowick, The Binding Effect of a State Court's Decision in a Subsequent
Federal Income Tax Case, 12 TAx L. REv. 213, 229-30 (1957).
33 See ibid.
34 See 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 23, § 1.11, at 74; Oliver, supra note 23, at 652-53.
35 See, e.g., id. at 640.
36 If the state judge had the tax-relevant state law issue consciously before him,
the interests of the Government and public would be injured only if he made an honest
mistake or acted in bad faith. This discussion is premised on the assumption that
state judges are less likely to make mistakes about state law than are federal
courts. Therefore, an argument against accepting a state court decision based on
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judge's decision is merely pro forma, as are, for instance, many consent
decrees and approvals of trust accounts, then he has not exercised his
presumed expertise in the state law.3 7  Moreover, for a party to claim
that it is unjust to tax him on a particular property interest sounds some-
what hollow if the interest was rightfully his and he knowingly declined or
neglected to oppose a petition which resulted in the decree awarding that
interest to another. At best, he has neglected to anticipate all the possible
consequences of an action which he has willingly taken. At worst, he has
lost a gamble to avoid the taxes 8 In many cases like the present one the
weakness in the taxpayer's cry for justice coincides with a failure of the
state court actually to consider the issues. In such cases the federal courts
should not blindly accept a state court decision as binding, even if it
purports to decide the property question involved in the federal tax pro-
ceeding, but should investigate the circumstances of that decision to deter-
mine whether to be bound by it.39
If the proceeding in the state court was truly adversary, the party
claiming justice has shown his unwillingness to part with the property
rights, and the state judge has had an opportunity to make a considered
decision, so the federal court should be bound. On the other hand, if the
proceeding was not adversary, any injustice is substantially reduced.
Furthermore, the absence of adverseness limits somewhat the state judge's
opportunity and incentive to determine accurately the applicable state law.
For these reasons it is arguable that the federal courts should not be bound
actual consideration of the merits of the legal issue must be founded on a fear that
the state judge will not act in good faith. To act on such a fear, unless its substan-
tiality were shown in the particular case by evidence sufficient to enable the federal
court to find fraud, would be unwarranted. See Commissioner v. Blair, 300 U.S. 5,
10 (1937) ; Stephens & Freeland, supra note 8, at 247.
37 Writers on the subject often state this fact in terms of a requirement that the
state decision adjudicate the issues "on the merits" before it will be held binding.
E.g., 1 MERTENS, FEDERAL. GnIT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 10.10 (1959) ; Stephens &
Freeland, mipra note 8, at 247.
38 The situation of such a taxpayer is similar to that of the taxpayer who is taxed
on income, the right to which he has given away. See, e.g., Helvering v. Eubank,
311 U.S. 122 (1940); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Strauss v. Commis-
sioner, 168 F.2d 441 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 858 (1948).
39To conform to the general practice of the federal courts, this inquiry can be
described as one to determine whether the state proceeding was "collusive." That term
has been avoided here because it invites confusion with the definitions of "collusion"
used in other areas of the law, see, e.g., 76 HARv. L. REv. 644, 645 (1963), as well
as with other meanings of the term adopted by various federal courts in ruling on
cases in the area under consideration.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is the preeminent example of a court
which seems to have concluded that it lacks the power to make an independent deter-
mination of the state law where a state court has rendered an opinion purporting to
decide the issue on the merits, even though the state decision follows the taxable
event. See, e.g., Beecher v. United States, 280 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1960) ; Estate of
Babcock v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1956); Gallagher v. Smith, 223
F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955) (en banc). The court recognized that it does not have the
power to look behind a state decision which establishes the property rights at issue
in the tax litigation, see note 23 supra, except to ascertain the absence of facts which
would deprive the decision of conclusiveness within the state, but it failed to perceive
that the state decisions with which it was dealing did not establish the precise property
rights at issue in the tax cases.
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by the result of any nonadversary state proceeding. Such a rule, however,
would make it impossible for taxpayers with a bona fide nontax reason for
simply finding out what their property rights are to depend on the results
of a state proceeding, and would probably go further than is necessary to
assure that the state judge has considered the issues.4 ° The federal courts
should therefore bind themselves to the results of any proceeding in which
they find that both sides have been presented with reasonable adequacy.
Even if both sides were not presented at the hearing, there may be other
indications that the judge has performed a conscientious job. An example
is given in Freuler, where the Supreme Court noted that the state court
had "ruled against the remaindermen on one point and in their favor on
another . .. . ' In addition a decision rendered by a state appellate
court should generally be held binding. If the trial court ruled against
the petitioner despite a lack of adverseness, the appellate court, even if
only the petitioner's side were effectively argued before it, would almost cer-
tainly consider the law carefully before reversing the trial judge. If the
trial court ruled for the petitioner, the fact that one of the defendants took
an appeal would tend to indicate a bona fide contest. The federal court,
however, should scrutinize the proceedings for indications that the appeal
was taken merely to create an illusion of adverseness and that no attempt
was really made to persuade the appellate court to reverse the decision
below.
42
Such an examination as that suggested is indicated by the opinion
in Blair and is at least not inconsistent with that in Freuler. While the
Supreme Court in both cases placed considerable reliance on the purely
formal characteristics of the proceedings, it also seems to have looked behind
them to discover whether the state court had actually passed on the merits.
In Blair the Court ruled that the state decision was binding largely because
the state appellate court had considered the lower court's decision, had
actually examined the state precedents, and had "reached a deliberate con-
clusion." 43 In Freuler the Court emphasized that objections to the account
had been presented, that the court had ruled against the remaindermen on
one point, and that the decree purported "not to be in any sense a consent
decree." 44
40 A rule making adverseness the touchstone might also be inconsistent with the
Supreme Court decisions in Freuler and Blair, for the degree of actual adverseness
in those cases, particularly the latter, was slight. Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218,
225 (3d Cir. 1955) (en banc); Colowick, supra note 32, at 214-17; 30 U. CHI. L.
Rrv. 569-71 (1963).
41291 U.S. at 45.
42 The courts seem generally to have accepted appeal as sufficient to validate a
state decision without further inquiry being necessary, but commentators have at-
tacked this position. Colowick, supra note 32, at 225-26; 30 U. CHI. L. Rzv.
569, 579-80 (1963). The writers have emphasized that taking an appeal does not
prove adverseness; however, the resultant decision is likely to have been well-con-
sidered and therefore entitled to binding effect.
43 300 U.S. at 10.
44 291 U.S. at 45.
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The reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in the
present case was commendable. The attorney's conference before trial with
the probate judge, at which the judge, surely without adequate oppor-
tunity to consider the legal issues, assured him that the widow's interest
would be declared a fee simple; the predominance of the tax motive; the
dual roles of the attorney and the widow, both of whom, as representatives
of the estate, had a duty to the children; and the failure to present the
opposing argument all tend to indicate that the probate court gave the
meaning of the state law less than a balanced and full consideration. In
addition the court of appeals properly took into account the level of
the state court.45
Only two of the considerations cited by the court to support its finding
of "collusion" are questionable. First, it cited the fact that the state deci-
sion was wrong. It is meaningless to say that a decision is binding if
right and not binding if wrong. To say it is binding must mean that the
federal court will accept its result without making an independent ex-
amination of the state law. If the court is to make and act on such an evalu-
ation anyway, then the state decision is not really binding; it is only because
the federal court has come to the same conclusion on the state law question
that the results coincide. Second, the court seems to have thought it
relevant that no notice was given to the federal tax authorities. This sug-
gests that the Commissioner should be obligated to appear in every such
case and make his argument, or be bound by the decision therein. Although
such a rule would give the Commissioner the opportunity to make his
contentions while leaving the decision of the question to the most com-
petent tribunal-the state court-, the burden on the Commissioner and
the Internal Revenue Service would not appear to be justified. The neces-
sity of investigating all the cases to decide whether they are worth the
Service's time to litigate, or of litigating every one, would require a vast
expansion of the Service.4 6 Furthermore, the state tribunal may well not
be the best one to entrust with the protection of the Government's interest.
47
The decision in the present case might seem unjust because of the
widow's apparent reliance on the state court judgment in choosing to take
under the will rather than against it.48 Because she was given a wrong
interpretation of the state law by the state court, the estate has been denied
even that marital deduction which it might rightfully have been able to
claim-the deduction which would have resulted if the widow had elected
to take against the will. This unjust result could and should have been
remedied, if the estate had proved that such reliance led the widow not to
45 Instant case at 443.
46 See, e.g., Stephens & Freeland, supra note 8, at 250-51; Colowick, supra note
32, at 232. The Commissioner has announced that "it is neither the policy nor prac-
tice' of the Internal Revenue Service to participate in litigation between private parties
in state courts, but he left the door open to exceptions. Mim. 6134, 4 CCH 1947
STAND. FED. TAx REP. 116137 (April 3, 1947).
47 See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
48 See notes 4, 6 supra.
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elect against the will, by treating the estate for federal tax purposes as if
she had elected. Thus, the state decision would be viewed as incorrect only
in giving her that portion of the estate in excess of what she would have
taken if she had elected against the will. In effect she gave up the right
to take against the will in order to receive the residue in fee simple. An
assertion that the taxpayer should have relied on the Commissioner's ruling,
not on the state court decision, is not persuasive: the Commissioner is an
interested party, and such a holding would give him altogether too much
power. Since, however, the estate does not appear to have contended that
the widow relied on the state decision, the court of appeals' adjudication
seems correct.
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-RuLE 30(b)
HELD To EMPOWER DISTRICT COURT To SEAL DEPOSITIO1NS ON
BASIS OF GOVERNMENT SUGGESTION OF INTEREST MADE AFTER
THaEY ARE TAKEN
A federal district court entered an order impounding the depositions
of the corporate plaintiff's president and enjoining the defendants and others
from publishing or disclosing the contents, which dealt with alleged in-
cidents of bribery of South American officials by the plaintiff,' regardless
of whether the information was obtained independently of the depositions.
The moving affidavit had alleged that publication of the described material
in South America would be harmful to the plaintiff, the deponent, and
United States foreign policy. The United States Attorney supported the
last allegation in a Suggestion of Interest 2 filed with the court. The
defendant took an interlocutory appeal.3 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, holding the order nonappealable but treating the appeal as
a motion for leave to file a petition for mandamus, 4 suggested modifica-
' The underlying dispute is set forth in International Prods. Corp. v. Koons,
33 F.R.D. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The defendant, Koons, was president and chairman
of the board of International Products from February 1, 1956, to March 3, 1961,
when he resigned. One Cremer succeeded Koons as chairman of the board. Cremer
and his associates became involved in a proxy fight with Koons for control of the
corporation. The stockholder meeting to decide the fight was held on May 11, 1962.
On May 4, 1962, International Products instituted an action against Koons, alleging
that while president and chairman of the board he had appropriated for himself vari-
ous business opportunities which he should have made available to the corporation.
On May 8 the Wall Street Journal published an article about the proxy fight in which
extensive reference was made to the allegations of the complaint. Cremer and his
associates won the election. On December 21, 1962, Koons filed an action against
Dow Jones (publisher of the Wall Street Journal), Cremer, and others alleging,
among other grounds, that they had conspired to institute or maintain an unfounded
action, had abused the process of the court, and had libelled him. The answers set
up various defenses, including the defense of truth. The deposition here in question
of the corporation president, Seldes, was taken pursuant to this litigation.
2REv. STAT. §367 (1875), 5 U.S.C. §316 (1958).
328 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) (1958).
4 The court read § 1292(a) (1) "as relating to injunctions which give or aid in
giving some or all of the substantive relief sought by a complaint . . . and not as
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tion of the order, holding that so much of it as related to information ob-
tained from the depositions was plainly authorized by rule 30(b) r but
stating that a limitation on use of independently-obtained information would
violate the first amendment. International Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325
F. 2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963).
The provisions of rules 30(b) and 30(d) were adopted as safeguards
for the protection of parties and deponents in view of the almost unlimited
right of discovery given by rule 26.6 Rule 30(b) 7 authorizes the court,
upon motion seasonably made by any party or the deponent and for good
cause shown, to forbid the taking of a deposition, or to limit the scope and
manner of the taking and use of the deposition. Rule 30(d) provides the
same type of protection during the course of the examination. Although
the order of the district court and the opinion of the court of appeals 8 in
the present case do not make clear whether the order impounding the
depositions was issued in order to protect the United States, the plaintiff,
including restraints or directions in orders concerning the conduct of the parties or
their counsel, unrelated to the substantive issues in the action, while awaiting trial."
Instant case at 406. But, if the district judge's action purportedly made under FED.
R. Cirv. P. 30(b) exceeds the power there given to a district court, the remedy of
mandamus is available. Instant case at 407.
Before this decision, the Second Circuit would not treat an improvident appeal
as a petition for a writ of mandamus. See, e.g., Zamore v. Goldblatt, 201 F.2d 738
(2d Cir. 1953) (per curiam) ; Mottolese v. Preston, 172 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1949)
(per curiam) ; Abbe v. New York, N.H. & H. Ry., 171 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1948)
(per curiam). The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, will treat an improvident
appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus. See, e.g., Steccone v. Morse-Starrett
Prods. Co., 191 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1951); Shapiro v. Bonanza Hotel Co., 185 F.2d
777 (9th Cir. 1950). The Second Circuit's reason for its previous position was a
desire to afford the judge an opportunity to defend his action-mandamus being
technically an action against the judge. But since this opportunity was rarely availed
of, the court here alters that position by handing down a "suggestion" as to the legality
of the lower court's action. The court says: "An expression of this Court's view
on such a motion will generally obviate any need for a petition or a writ, while still
leaving it open to the judge to await a formal petition in the rare case where he
wishes to be heard." Instant case at 407. If the lower court does not comply with
the "suggestion," the appellants may petition for a writ, and the judge may then
answer the petition.
5 FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b) [hereinafter individual Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
referred to as rule].
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b), (d), note.
7 (b) Orders for the Protection of Parties and Deponents. After notice is
served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon motion seasonably
made by any party or by the person to be examined and upon notice and for
good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may make an
order that the deposition shall not be taken, or that it may be taken only at
some designated place other than that stated in the notice, or that it may be
taken only in written interrogatories, or that certain matters shall not be
inquired into, or that the scope of the examination shall be limited to certain
matters, or that the examination shall be held with no one present except
the parties to the action and their officers or counsel, or that after being
sealed the deposition shall be opened only by order of the court, or that secret
processes, developments, or research need not be disclosed, or that the parties
shall simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court; or the court may make any
other order which justice requires to protect the party or witness from an-
noyance, embarrassment, or oppression.
8 Because of the district court's impounding order, other materials which might
help answer this problem are unavailable.
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or the deponent, the court of appeals seems to recognize that the United
States' interest was an important factor in the district court's decision to-
issue the order.9 Since rule 30(b) apparently authorizes orders for the
protection only of parties and deponents,"' issuance of an order under that
rule in order to protect the United States would seem to constitute error
requiring vacation of the order," unless the United States was a party.
The United States did not enter as a party by intervening; thus its status
as a party must depend solely on the Suggestion of Interest. The Sugges-
tion of Interest, however, merely allows the Government to appear and par-
ticipate in private suits.' 2  To become a party it must formally intervene; 13
but, it did not comply with the procedures for intervention required by
rule 24(c). Moreover, the Government's interest does not seem to fall
within the categories specified in rule 24(a) for intervention of right, and
the district court does not appear to have exercised the discretion required
under rule 24(b) governing permissive intervention. 14
Even if the order was made to protect the plaintiff or deponent, or the
United States was entitled to protection, the order sealing the depositions
9 The court of appeals not only stresses the Suggestion of Interest throughout but
also addresses itself at length in a footnote to the desirability of the Department of
State adopting "procedures . . . to assure a hearing to the other side before it moves
into a case like this." Instant case at 409 n.6. It says such procedures are desirable
because of "the weight properly given by courts to representations of the Department
of State," and suggests that the Department might have decided not to participate in
the present case if it had heard the defendants' side. Ibid. This discussion seems
to indicate that the court thought the district court might not have issued the order
had the United States not filed the Suggestion of Interest.
1' The title of rule 30(b) is "Orders for the Protection of Parties and Deponents."
The final phrase of the rule states: "or the court may make any other order which
justice requires to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or
oppression." (Emphasis added.)
11 Cf. Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 84 Sup. Ct. 769 (1964).
32 See Meredith v. Van Oosterhout, 286 F.2d 216 (8th Cir. 1960) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 835 (1961); Calhoun County v. Roberts, 137 F.2d 130 (5th
Cir. 1943) (per curiam). See generally Note, Federal Intervention in Private Actions
Involving the Public Interest, 65 HARv. L. Ray. 319 (1951).
13 See Walker v. Reynolds Metal Co., 87 F. Supp. 283 (D. Ore. 1949) (Fee, J.)
(rejecting a petition of the United States to appear by way of "representation of
interest" and saying that to become a party the United States must formally request
such status) ; 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE 24.12, at 95 (2d ed. 1963) ("An order
authorizing intervention is, of course, necessary before the petitioner becomes a
party."); cf. United States v. Dollar, 196 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1952), holding the
Government not bound by judgment in a case in which it had participated extensively,
apparently pursuant to both REv. STAT. § 359 (1875), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 309
(1958) (authorizing the Justice Department to provide counsel for a party in a
private suit and in effect to litigate the action), and Rxv. STAT. § 367 (1875), 5 U.S.C.
§ 316 (1958) (the statute authorizing Suggestions of Interest). But cf. Grimm v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 3 F.R.D. 198 (N.D. Tex. 1943), criticized in 4 MooRE,
op. cit. supra 24.12, at 95 n.10.
14 Except for a qualification not relevant here, rule 24 places the federal govern-
ment on the same footing as a private party with respect to intervention. Above all,
this means that intervention is allowed only in the discretion of the court. See MooRE,
op. cit. supra note 13, 24.10[5], at 64-66. Compare All Am. Airways v. Village of
Cedarhurst, 201 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1953), and West India Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Seatrain
Lines, 170 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. dimnissed, 336 U.S. 908 (1949), with E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Lyles & Lang Constr. Co., 219 F.2d 328 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 956 (1955), and H. K. Ferguson Co. v. Nickel Processing
Corp., 33 F.R.D. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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and limiting the defendants in their use of information obtained therefrom
seems to be unauthorized by rule 30(b), which provides only for orders
to be issued "upon motion seasonably made by any party or by the person
to be examined." 15 This language, as well as the wording of other dis-
covery rules,16 seems to anticipate only orders issued before the deposition
is taken.17 Furthermore, a construction of rule 30(b) to authorize orders
after this time renders rule 30(d) partly surplusage.' 8 By allowing a
protective order to be made after the depositions are taken, the court causes
a party to incur the expense and possible inconvenience of taking a deposi-
tion which he might have foregone if he had known his use of it would be
limited.19 The court thus effectively bypasses the seasonability requirement
of rule 30(b). The limitation on use can also have a far-reaching effect on
15 Emphasis added.
16Rule 26(b), dealing with the scope of depositions, states: "Unless otherwise
ordered by the court as provided by Rule 30(b) or (d), the deponent may be examined
.... " Rule 31(d), dealing with orders for the protection of parties and deponents
in relation to depositions of witnesses upon written interrogatories, states: "After
the service of interrogatories and prior to the taking of the testimony of the deponent,
the court . . . may make any order specified in Rule 30 which is appropriate and
just . . . " Rule 33, dealing with interrogatories to parties, states: "The provisions
of Rule 30(b) are applicable for the protection of the party from whom answers to
interrogatories are sought under this rule."
17 The framers of the rules seem to have directed their attention exclusively to
the dangers of harassment and disclosure at the deposition hearing. Court considera-
tion of the question of rule 30(b)'s authorization of orders after the deposition is
almost nonexistent. The Second Circuit has suggested in dictum that rule 30(b)
does not authorize issuance of orders after the taking of the depositions. In Zwack
v. Kraus Bros. & Co., 237 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1956), the parties stipulated prior to
the taking of plaintiff's deposition that the questions and answers would not be sent
to Hungary before obtaining a ruling from the court, and the court granted plaintiff's
motion to enjoin the sending, stating that, although the order had been applied for
only after the deposition, the rule 30(b) motion was saved by the stipulation. Cf.
Ferguson v. Ford Motor Co., 8 F.R.D. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). On the other hand,
in Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Bruno-New York, Inc., 17 F.R.D. 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1955),
a district court actually issued an order on motion made after the examination, without,
however, discussing the question of timeliness. Cf. Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603
(7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 965 (1956). Professor Moore has suggested
that, although "Rule 30(b) has to do mainly with the degree of disclosure of infor-
mation," it might authorize a court to "control the use of information after it had
been disclosed . . . ... 4 Moopy, op. cit. supra note 13, It 30.15, at 74 (Supp. 1962).
In a footnote he cites Bain & Blank for the proposition that "the Court has power
to limit the use of information obtained through discovery either under the provisions
of Rule 30(b) or under its general equity powers." Id. ff 30.15, at 74 n.9a. Aside
from this single mention, the leading commentators appear not even to have considered
the possibility of orders under rule 30(b) after the deposition has begun. They all
describe the rule simply as authorizing orders before that time. 2A BARRoN &
HoLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTI cE AND PRocEDUR § 715, at 231 (Wright ed. 1961); 4
MooRE, op. cit. supra note 13, 11  30.04-.05; Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74
H~av. L. REv. 940, 980-81 (1961).
18 Although rule 30(d) would still contribute its detailed treatment of the special
consequences of an order made during the course of the deposition, an interpretation
of rule 30(b) to authorize orders after the beginning of the deposition would conflict
with the common understanding that 30(d) provides protection at a time when 30(b)
no longer can be employed. See, e.g., 2A BAuON & HOLTZOFF, Op. Cit. SUpra note 17,
§ 717, at 256: "In addition to the protection before examination begins accorded by
Rule 30(b), continued protection during the course of the examination is provided
by Rule 30(d)."
1) In the present case, for instance, the use of the information might have been
extremely valuable to the defendant in restoring his reputation, since he was counter-
claiming for libel arising out of the same transaction. See note 1 supra.
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pretrial procedure by forcing litigants to rearrange their pretrial tactics.
A party may suddenly find he cannot ask certain questions because to do
so would reveal information which had been sealed. He may thus find
it necessary to explore and develop new sources of information to sustain
his case.
On the other hand rule 30(b) does authorize "any other order which
justice requires," a catchall provision which could be construed to include
even orders after the taking of the deposition, despite the contrary implica-
tions of the language in this and other rules. In support of this construc-
tion, it can be argued that rules 30(b) and 30(d), as the only rules provid-
ing for protective orders in a section which permits extremely broad dis-
covery, should themselves be interpreted broadly. Such a result would be
in keeping with the general tendency of the discovery rules to give the dis-
trict courts broad discretion. While this interpretation of the rule is
desirable in order to give the flexibility needed to protect parties under every
circumstance, the present wording of the rules does not support such a
result. Furthermore, the phrase "any other order which justice requires"
has been construed as being meant to deal only with situations in which a
kind of protective order other than one expressly stated in rule 30(b) is
appropriate.2 0 Therefore, it was unjustifiable for the court in the present
case to hold without discussion that the order was "plainly authorized."
Hopefully, the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules will in the course
of its current revision of the discovery section clarify the rules to allow
orders after depositions are taken. 21 If orders after depositions are per-
mitted, the district court should take care, in weighing the interests of the
parties, to take into account the above-mentioned factors not present when
it issues an order before or during the deposition.
If the order sealing the depositions was not authorized by rule 30(b),
it still might arguably come within the inherent "'equitable powers of
courts of law over their own process to prevent abuses, oppression, and
injustices,' "22 which were formally recognized by the Supreme Court in
1888 in Gumbel v. Pitkin. 2 3 The Court there ordered the court below to
exercise its inherent equity powers to prevent and redress injustices in-
flicted upon a stranger to the litigation by the abuse of processes on the part
of its officers and suitors. Yet there is a question as to how far the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure go in preempting certain areas from an exercise
of inherent equity powers. The Supreme Court has held that rule 37 is
the exclusive remedy for noncompliance with a production order, and courts
may not punish noncompliance by an exercise of any inherent powers. 24
20 See 4 Mooit, op. cit. supra note 13, ff 30.15.
21 Compare FFD. R. CRIM. P. 16(e) (Second Prelim. Draft of Proposed Amends.,
March 1964).
2 2 Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 144 (1888).
23124 U.S. 131 (1888).
24 Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207-08 (1958); accord, Inde-
pendent Prods. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 283 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1960). See generally
Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 480 (1958).
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In so holding the court emphasized the fact that rule 37 addresses itself with
particularity to the consequences of failure to produce by listing a variety
of remedies as well as authorizing any order which is "just." It noted that
this general provision provides the courts with the flexibility they would
otherwise lose by being deprived of their inherent equity powers. The
treatment of rule 37 can be contrasted with the Supreme Court's treatment
of rule 41 (b), which provides for involuntary dismissal of a case on motion
by the defendant. In Link v. Wabash R.R.,2 5 the Court held that rule
41(b) does not remove a district court's inherent power to dismiss on its
own motion for failure to prosecute. The Court found that neither the
permissive language of the rule-which merely authorizes motions by the
defendant-nor its policy required the conclusion that the rule abrogated
the court's inherent power to clear its calendar of cases dormant due to a
plaintiff's dilatoriness. It said that there would have to be a much clearer
expression of purpose than that provided in rule 41(b) for the Court to
assume it was intended to abrogate so well-acknowledged a power. The
Supreme Court's treatment of rules 37 and 41(b) makes it clear that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure still leave an area for the exercise of
inherent equity powers,2 6 but that in certain instances the rules do preempt.
As previously indicated, the extension of rule 30(b) orders to the time
after depositions are taken could disrupt a litigant's pretrial preparation.
The same undesirable effect would result from allowing similar orders to be
made under the inherent equity powers. Furthermore, the "just" provision
of rule 37(b), which the Supreme Court emphasized in finding that rule
exclusive, is paralleled by the "any other order which justice may require"
provision of rule 30(b).27 Both are catchall provisions which provide the
flexibility which a court must have if it is to operate without any inherent
powers. Where such a catchall appears and exclusivity is indicated by the
rule's setting, the rule should be interpreted as preempting the general in-
herent power.28
25370 U.S. 626 (1962). The Supreme Court was merely accepting a doctrine
which had been developed in the courts of appeals. See, e.g., Slavitt v. Meader, 278
F.2d 276 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 831 (1960); Shotkin v.
Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1948).
26In the instant case the district court exercised its inherent equity powers to
impound all affidavits submitted by the defendants. Control of the use of court
documents has traditionally been recognized as an inherent equity power. See, e.g.,
Parker v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 320 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1963) (per curiam) ;
Pollack v. Aspbury, 14 F.R.D. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 903
(1954). The power was exercised because of the possibility that nonparticipants in
the litigation might give unwarranted weight or credence to materials in the affidavits
because of "their quasi-official appearance." Instant case at 408. The lack of any
relevanf provision in the Federal Rules indicates that such an order was not pre-
empted. Compare MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1958) (court refused
to read rule 42 as prohibiting by negative implication pretrial consolidation of cases).
2  The analogy is not precise, since the Supreme Court may have been influenced
in its construction of the preemptive scope of rule 37(b) by the fact that the rule
provides for punitive measures, but it is close enough to demand consideration.2 8 Contra, Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Bruno-New York, Inc., 17 F.R.D. 346, 348
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (alternative holding), stated without disapproval in 4 MoomR op.
cit. sipra note 13, 1 30.15, at 74 n.9a (Supp. 1962).
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While the court's inherent powers to issue orders for the protection of
parties and deponents seem to be preempted, the Federal Rules contain no
provisions for orders protecting strangers to the litigation. It would seem
unwarranted to construe rule 30(b) as depriving the courts of all power
to protect strangers. Furthermore, it is arguable that the courts must
retain the power to issue orders protecting strangers after the depositions
are taken because of the likelihood that the strangers will not receive notice
of the depositions. In circumstances like those in the present case, the
argument for judicial power to issue protective orders at any time is fortified
by an impressive body of authority which represents exercise by the courts
of a special inherent power to defer to requests of the executive branch
in matters involving foreign policy, even though the United States is not a
party to the suit29 This doctrine has evolved separately from the statutory
Suggestion of Interest and from the general inherent equity power.30
Although a holding on the basis of the executive suggestion in circumstances
like those in the present case would represent an extension of the doctrine,
its rationale-to prevent the courts from exercising their jurisdiction in
such a way as to embarrass the executive branch in its conduct of foreign
relations 31-- is applicable.
Although the order in the present case might have been permissible if
issued pursuant to this equity power to protect strangers to the litigation,
the order purportedly was issued pursuant to rule 30(b).32 Thus, it seems
likely that the district court gave substantial weight to the interests of the
plaintiff or deponent, as well as those of the Government. Therefore, the
court of appeals should have vacated the order and remanded, instructing
the district court to reissue the order only if it felt that the interest of the
Government alone warranted it.
The court's extension of the time for protective orders beyond that
provided for by the rules is rendered more serious because these orders are
reviewable only on mandamus and therefore will be set aside only if "in
excess of jurisdiction." 34 Thus, the trial judge is given absolute discre-
tion to issue any type of order authorized by rule 30(b) at a stage in the
litigation when much mischief may be wrought by such orders.
29 The expression of executive views has affected the decisions of courts in the
areas of "recognition of nations and governments; sovereign and diplomatic immunity;
acts of state, such as nationalization; the existence of a state of war or neutrality;
the status and interpretation of treaties; the issuance of passports; immigration,
nationality, and entry for business purposes." Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State
Department Suggestions: Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurperf, 48
CopRIxLL L.Q. 461, 463 (1963).
30 Judicial deference in these cases is at least in part a function of the separation
of powers. Id. at 462.
31 Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1943) ; see Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 84 Sup. Ct. 923, 934-46 (1964) (act of state doctrine).
32 Instant case at 406-07.
33 Cf. text accompanying note 11 supra.
34 Instant case at 407; see note 4 supra.
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PRESUMPTIONS-STATuTE ALLOWING PRESUMPTION OF Pos-
SEssioN FRoM PRESENCE AT AN IVEGAIL ST]ML VIoLATES DUE
PROCESS
At defendants' trial for possession of an illegal distillery,' the Gov-
ernment's evidence depended in part upon a showing of defendants' presence
at the still.2  The defendants neither testified nor offered any explanation
of this presence.s The trial judge, charging the jury that it might, but
need not, infer that the defendants possessed the still if it found they were
present,4 relied upon a federal statute stating that presence is sufficient evi-
dence of possession unless explained to the satisfaction of the jury.5 Defend-
ants were found guilty. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that the statute violated due process since there was no "rational connec-
tion" between the basic fact of presence and the presumed fact of pos-
session.6 It reversed the conviction because the jury might have relied
1 Possession of an illegal distillery is a violation of INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 5601(a) (1). This amended section was enacted in 1958. The second count charged
defendants with carrying on the business of a distiller without having given bond as
required by law, in violation of § 5601(a) (4), and the third count with carrying on
the business of a distiller with intent to defraud the United States of taxes, in vio-
lation of § 5602.
2 Two arresting revenue agents testified that the defendants arrived at the site
around 4:00 a.m. in a truck carrying a butane gas cylinder similar to others found
at the site, that the defendants attempted to escape when the agents approached them,
and that one of the defendants, within the hearing of the other two, admitted that they
all owned the still. Further, the owner of the land on which the still was located
testified that one of the defendants had requested that the owner rent part of the
land to the defendants for business purposes. Record, pp. 6, 8-9, 28-30, 37, 41-42,
United States v. Barrett, Criminal No. 1411, M.D. Ga., Jan. 16, 1962.
3 The defense offered no evidence other than a transcript of a prior trial for
the purpose of claiming double jeopardy. Id. at 44-45. Cross examination was
limited to asking the agents whether the defendants were found working or operating
the still, and attempting to show that it was not uncommon for persons, other than
the owner of a still, to operate it. Id. at 25, 41-42.
4 Id. at 61-63.
5 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 5601(b) (1), provides:
Whenever on trial for violation of subsection (a) (1) the defendant is shown
to have been at the site or place where, and at the time when, a still or dis-
tilling apparatus was set up without having been registered, such presence
of the defendant shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction,
unless the defendant explains such presence to the satisfaction of the jury
(or of the court when tried without a jury).
Subsection (b) (4) provides a similar presumption for carrying on the business of
a distiller without registering or giving bond.
There is no presumption statute for the third count, see note I supra, and the
court of appeals decided that even if the presumptions involved in the first two counts
were valid, the jury instruction must clearly charge that no presumption exists for
count three, which was not done by the trial judge. Instant case at 300.
6 The Fifth Circuit indicated that the statute might also violate the privilege
against self-incrimination by placing unreasonable pressure upon the defendant to take
the stand. Instant case at 296. However, the Supreme Court has stated that any
constraint to testify from a presumption arises "simply from the force of circumstances
and not from any form of compulsion forbidden by the Constitution." Yee Hem v.
United States, 268 U.S. 178, 185 (1925) (upholding a narcotics presumption). The
Supreme Court likened the situation to any case in which the prosecution evidence
demands an explanation from the defendant. He is not forced to take the stand and
may elect to hope that absent an explanation the jury may nonetheless acquit.
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upon the presumption, but remanded for a new trial since there was suffi-
cient evidence without the presumption to support a jury verdict of guilty.7
Barrett v. United States, 322 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 375
U.S. 962 (1964) (No. 606).
A criminal statutory presumption describes a legally recognized rela-
tionship between ,two factual situations whereby, upon unrebutted proof
of one fact, the existence of the other fact may be assumed." Such a
presumption formally shifts a burden of proof onto the party against whom
it is invoked. It may shift only the burden of coming forward with credible
evidence, or it may shift the entire burden of persuasion. A criminal de-
fendant normally has a practical problem of proof when the prosecution's
evidence creates an inference of guilt which he must explain to the satis-
faction of the jury, or risk conviction on the strength of that inference.
Since the presumption of innocence initially places the burden of proof upon
the Government, however, due process requires that this burden be
formally shifted only when clearly justified.
In Tot v. United States,9 an ex-convict was convicted of receiving a
firearm which had been shipped in interstate commerce under a statute
which stated that possession of a firearm by any person previously convicted
of a crime of violence "shall be presumptive evidence that such firearm was
shipped or transported or received" in interstate commerce.' 0 The Supreme
Court invalidated the presumption as being "so strained as not to have a
reasonable relation to the circumstances of life as we know them .
In the course of its analysis, the Court mentioned that the relative accessi-
bility of the evidence must make it "just" if the defendant is to assume the
7 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in dealing with similar facts, has
also declared these statutory presumptions invalid. United States v. Romano, 330
F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1964). In that case the defendants were found at an illegal still
located in a building. No explanation was offered and the judge charged on the
presumption, but the court of appeals, citing the present case, found the presumptions
unconstitutional. The court did not remand since there was no other evidence on
which a jury could convict.
8 See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 308 (1954). See generally 9 WIGMOREy, EvIDNacE
§§ 2491-94 (3d ed. 1940) ; Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 VAND. L.
Rxv. 324 (1952); Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52
MIcH. L. REv. 195, 196-209 (1953).
Such presumptions are to be distinguished from irrebuttable or conclusive pre-
sumptions, such as presuming a woman capable of childbirth at any age. See, e.g.,
Donald v. Troxell, 346 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). But see In re Bassetts
Estate, 190 A.2d 415 (N.H. 1963). Another such conclusion of law is that which
deems a certain number of years adverse possession irrebuttable evidence of a lost
grant of title to the property. See, e.g., People v. System Properties, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d
330, 141 N.E.2d 429, 160 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1957). On the other hand a true presumption
should not be confused with a simple logical inference which any jury is entitled to
find because of human experience. See MICHAEL & ADLER, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL
PROOF 15-17, 373-77 (1931).
9319 U.S. 463 (1943).
1052 Stat. 1250-51 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 902(f) (1958).
1" Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 468 (1943).
Even less basis for the inference exists when it is recognized that the jury must
presume such interstate receipt after 1938, the effective date of the statute, only three
years previous to the trial. The court in Tot recognized this consideration, but seemed
to say that the statute was invalid even without the time factor. See ibid.
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burden.' 2 The Court was unwilling to permit convenience of evidence alone
to uphold a presumption, as all defendants can presumably explain the
evidence as well as, if not better than, the prosecution. Moreover, evidence
of Tot's prior convictions, admissible if he took the stand, might not only
discredit his testimony, but also affirmatively aid the prosecution.13 It held
that statutory criminal presumptions must bear a "rational connection
between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed . *.".." 14
Statutes creating presumptions generally are worded either that the
basic fact "shall be presumptive evidence," 15 or that "it shall be sufficient
evidence unless explained to the satisfaction of the jury." 16 In interpreting
the words "presumptive evidence" the Court in Tot implied that these
words shifted only the burden of going forward with evidence, but that
such evidence must be credible in order to remove the impact of the
presumption.' 7 However, the words "to the satisfaction of the jury" seem
to imply that the burden of persuasion has shifted to the defendant so that
he must persuade the jury by a preponderance of the evidence that the
presumed fact is false. Hawes v. Georgia,'8 an earlier Supreme Court case,
involved a presumption statute which appears to have done more than
simply shift the burden of coming forward. The Court upheld a state
statute which created a presumption of knowing possession of a still from
evidence that the still was on the defendant's property. The burden shifted
was not defined, although the statute read that "the burden of proof in all
cases [was] . . . upon the person in actual possession to show the want
of knowledge of the existence of such apparatus on his premises." 19 In
12 1d. at 469. In Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 89 (1934), Mr. Justice
Cardozo, speaking for a unanimous Court, stated that the burdens of proof may be
shifted to the defendant only when "upon a balancing of convenience or of the oppor-
tunities of knowledge the shifting of the burden will be . . . an aid to the accuser
without subjecting the accused to hardship or oppression." Accord, Rossi v. United
States, 289 U.S. 89, 91-92 (1933) (dictum) ; Reynolds v. United States, 289 F.2d 698,
699 (10th Cir. 1961) (dictum) ; cf. United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 360-61
(1950).
'3 Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 470 (1943).
14 Id. at 467.
The Supreme Court first recognized this test in Mobile, J. & K.C.R.R. v. Turnip-
seed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910) (civil case), and in Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219,
238 (1911) (criminal case), but it was not until Tot was decided in 1943 that "rational
connection" became the sole test for statutory presumptions.
15 52 Stat. 1250 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 901(f) (1958) (illegal firearms);
see, e.g., People v. Terra, 303 N.Y. 332, 102 N.E.2d 576 (1951) ; People v. Cannon,
139 N.Y. 32, 34 N.E. 759 (1893).
1070 Stat. 570 (1956), 21 U.S.C. §§174, 176(a) (1958); INT. R. v. CoDE OF
1954, § 5851.
17 Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 470 (1963).
18 258 U.S. 1 (1922).
19 Ga. Acts Ex. Sess. 1917, § 22, at 18. This statute was upheld even though the
defendant was not allowed to testify as a witness because of the Georgia incompetency
rule, and even though the jury charge stated that the jury "should find the defendant
guilty" unless the presumption was rebutted. Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1, 2 (1922).
(Emphasis added.) The term "should" seems stronger than the permissive "may
find" generally used in such jury charges.
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Yee Hem v. United States,20 the Supreme Court upheld a presumption
which provided that the defendant could rebut it only by introducing evi-
dence "to the satisfaction of the jury." The Court did not mention whether
such words actually shifted the burden of persuasion.
While, in the present case, the defendants offered no explanation of
their presence, 21 the distinction may become crucial when rebutting evidence
is offered, and the judge must determine whether the presumption should
be mentioned to the jury. If the statute is interpreted as shifting only
the burden of going forward with credible evidence, the judge apparently
may determine when the evidence is credible and the presumption rebutted;
then the presumption would not be mentioned to the jury in his charge.
However, the statutory language "to the satisfaction of the jury" seems to
prohibit the judge from making this determination and requires that once
the basic fact is established he inform the jury of the presumption. Since
shifting the burden of going forward demands credible evidence, however,
if the judge does not find the presumption rebutted, there may be little prac-
tical difference once the case reaches the jury. It seems unrealistic to ask
a jury to distinguish between credible and satisfactory evidence; credible
evidence to a jury may well be evidence which they are satisfied is true.
22
Nonetheless, when the judge is prohibited from dismissing the presumption,
even after rebutting evidence has been introduced, it may well be that the
increased burden on the defendant requires a stricter test of reasonableness
in upholding the validity of the presumption.
A presumption either may be sufficient alone to establish the ultimate
issue of guilt, such as presence-to-possession in the present case, or pos-
session-to-illegal receipt in Tot, or it may be used only to establish a
particular element of a crime.2 3 Regardless of the burden actually shifted
by the statutory language, by upholding a presumption which is deter-
minative of the ultimate issue and allowing it to go to the jury, the court,
in effect, is deciding that the evidence is sufficient to warrant conviction.
In general a court tests the sufficiency of the totality of the evidence 24 in
criminal cases by ascertaining that a reasonable jury could find the de-
fendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.25 Thus, if the presumption is
20 268 U.S. 178 (1925).
21 See note 3 supra.
22 See generally McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function
of a Burden of Persuasion, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1382 (1955).
23 An example would be presuming receipt of a letter sent in the mails in order
to prove knowledge of its contents as an element of a conspiracy.
24 See generally Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage
in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1152-63 (1960).
25 Generally the judge makes this determination by making a preliminary deter-
mination that guilt has been proven to his satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Isbell v. United States, 227 Fed. 788, 792 (8th Cir. 1915). See also Curley v.
United States, 160 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837 (1947). However,
the Second Circuit seems to hold the judge need only insure that guilt is proven by a
preponderance of the evidence in order to send the case to the jury. See United States
v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668, 671 (2d Cir. 1955), aff'd, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); United
States v. Valenti, 134 F.2d 362, 364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 761 (1943).
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determinative of the ultimate issue of guilt, courts should similarly test its
validity by asking whether a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the presumed fact is true if the basic fact is true.2 6  This test
might well give familiar meaning to the vague Tot test of "rational connec-
tion." Since the legislature has created the inference, the court should give
weight to the legislative judgment that the presumption is reasonable.
2 7
It should apply the three-step test of whether it is reasonable for the legis-
lature to find that it is reasonable for a jury to find the presumed fact beyond
a reasonable doubt 2 8 Thus, the court should look first to the legislative
history of the statute in order to determine whether the legislature was
acting upon knowledge not otherwise available to the court.2 9
In the present case the Fifth Circuit held that the connection between
the basic fact of presence and the presumed fact of possession must be one of
"reasonableness" rather than "bare rationality." 30 The legislative history 3 1
of the statute does not offer any evidence that Congress had found that
experience showed a sufficient rational connection between presence at a
still and possession. The major light shed on the statute by the legislative
history is, as was recognized by the Fifth Circuit, that the express purpose
of Congress was to overrule that part of Bozza v. United States 3 2 in which
the Supreme Court had held, in effect, that presence at a still was insufficient
for conviction of possession. In that case there was evidence that the de-
fendant was present at a still set up in a building, and had helped another
party in the manufacture and transportation of alcohol, and, on occasion,
had operated the still. The Court held that there was no showing that the
26 If the presumption does not concern the ultimate issue of guilt, its validity
should be tested by the simple reasonableness of the connection between the two facts.
27 See Morgan, Tot v. United States: Constitutional Restrictions on Statutory
Presumptions, 56 HARV. L. Rxv. 1324, 1325 (1943).
The opinion in Tot does not make clear whether the judgment of the legislature
should be considered. See text accompanying note 11 supra, where the relevant
quotation from the opinion is given. Although the lower courts, United States v.
Tot, 42 F. Supp. 252 (1941), aff'd, 131 F.2d 261 (1942), considered the judgment of
Congress, the Supreme Court made no mention of it.
2 8 Initially, a statutory presumption should not be declared unconstitutional
simply because the court, by its own knowledge, finds it unreasonable. Judges may
often differ as to the sufficiency of evidence and as to the permissibility of various
inferences. Compare Fowler v. United States, 234 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1956), and
Vick v. United States, 216 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1954), with Harding v. United States,
182 F.2d 524 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 874 (1950), and Barton v. United
States, 267 Fed. 174 (4th Cir. 1920). The statutory presumption should only be
interpreted as a legislative determination that all judges must allow this set of facts
to be sufficient. See McCoRmicK, EvDmEcE § 313, at 660 (1954). However, when
the legislature offers no justifications as to the reasonableness of the inference, the
court will be forced to rely on its own knowledge. See Morgan, supra note 27, at 1325.
It may be necessary for a defendant to offer careful documentation substantiating
his claim as to the reasonableness of the presumption if he is successfully to attack
the statutory presumption. Compare United States v. Gibson, 310 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.
1962), with Erwing v. United States, 323 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1963), 50 VA. L. REv. 183.
29 Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 148-49 (1937).
3 0 Instant case at 297.
31 S. REP. No. 2090, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 188-89 (1958). The excerpt appearing
in the Senate report is a reproduction of the House report accompanying this
legislation. See H.R. REP. No. 481, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 175 (1958).
32 330 U.S. 160 (1947).
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defendant had acted in any "capacity calculated to facilitate the custody
or possession" 33 of the still. The Court stressed that Congress had broken
the various steps of illegal distilling into many separate offenses and that
testimony to prove each "must point directly to conduct within the narrow
margins which the statute alone defines." 34
The major difficulty in upholding the inference of possession is that
the statute has created fourteen different, yet closely related crimes. Ex-
amples are possession of an illegal still,as illegally carrying on the business
of a distillery,3 6 producing illegal alcohol,
37 illegally manufacturing mash,
38
and removing and concealing illegal alcohol. 39 Possession implies custody
of the still to such an extent that a person has "personal charge of, or is
exercising the rights of management and control over" the still.
4o Whether
or not it is unlikely that an innocent person would simply happen to stumble
upon such a still, presence, without more, does nothing to remove the sub-
stantial possibility that the defendant is at the still-site for the purpose
of engaging in illegal activities other than possession. 41 Presence appears
to be just as relevant in proving any of the enumerated offenses as it is for
possession.
42
33 Id. at 164.
34 Id. at 163. Defendant was convicted of (1) carrying on the business of a dis-
tiller with intent to defraud the Government of taxes; (2) having possession and
custody of an illegal still; (3) making and fermenting mash for the production of
illegal alcohol; (4) unlawfully concealing distilled spirits with intent to defraud the
Government of taxes; and (5) unlawful transportation of distilled spirits with intent
to defraud. The court of appeals reversed as to counts four and five, finding insuffi-
cient evidence. United States v. Bozza, 155 F.2d 592 (1946). The Supreme Court
also reversed as to count one, again, on the grounds of insufficient evidence.
3 5 IN r. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 5601(a) (1).
3 6 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 5601(a) (2).
3 7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 5601(a) (8).
3 8 IN r. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 5601(a) (7).
39 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §5601(a) (12).
40 McFarland v. United States, 273 F.2d 417, 419 (1960) ; cf. Barfield v. United
States, 229 F.2d 936 (1956) (possession connotes domination or supremacy of
authority) ; Pearson v. United States, 192 F.2d 681 (1951) (mere driving of a truck
is not possession of truck's cargo).
It is doubtful whether the doctrine of constructive possession, as applied in Hawes
v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1 (1922), see notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text, could
be extended to this situation in order to hold the owner of a large tract of wooded
area, upon which a still is found, presumptively guilty unless he can show that he
knew nothing about it.
41 In the present case, the Fifth Circuit felt that the possibility that the defendants
were innocent hunters, or only purchasers of illegal alcohol, was not reduced by a
showing of presence at the still. Instant case at 300. Compare United States v.
Romano, 330 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1964). Other courts, including the Fifth Circuit,
have, on previous occasions, applied the presumption without questioning its consti-
tutionality. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 317 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1963) ; United
States v. Ivey, 310 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 929 (1963);
Robbins v. United States, 290 F.2d 281 (10th Cir. 1961).
42 Presence is declared presumptively sufficient evidence for (1) possession of
an unregistered distillery; (2) carrying on the business of a distiller without having
given bond as required by law; (3) unlawful production, removal, or use of material
fit for production of distilled spirits; and (4) producing distilled spirits when not
authorized by law. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 5601(b).
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While convenience to the prosecution may have caused Congress to
create the inference, convictions could be accomplished in ways other than
in shifting the burden of explanation to the defendant. It is not necessary
for revenue agents to make their arrest as soon as a person reaches a still-
site. Although it is not relevant to the question of reasonableness, the
proper enforcement of the revenue laws should not be impaired by a burden
of waiting until there is more substantial evidence. As in the present case,
the circumstances surrounding the presence often will create legitimate
inferences sufficient for conviction. But without such circumstantial evi-
dence, presence alone seems insufficient to convict, either with or without
the aid of a statutory presumption.
RATE REGULATION-COMPETITVELY-COPELED, COMPENSA-
TORY AML-COMMODITY RAILROAD FREIGHT RATES APPLIOABLE TO
MIXED AN-D STRAIGHT CARLOADS HEL VALID
American railroads early simplified the immense task of ratemaking by
grouping commodities into classifications,1 to each of which was applied a
"class rate" per hundred pounds for less-than-carload quantities and a
lower class rate for quantities constituting a carload.2 In 1910 Congress
passed what is now section 1 (6) of the Interstate Commerce Act, declaring:
It is made the duty of all common carriers subject to the provi-
sions of this chapter to establish, observe, and enforce just and
reasonable classifications of property for transportation .
and every unjust and unreasonable classification . . . is pro-
hibited and declared to be unlawful. 3
Under this statute, the Interstate Commerce Commission has approved
classifications based upon value, cost, and demand factors.4 For certain
freight travelling between particular points, it also has traditionally per-
mitted exceptions from classifications called "commodity rates." 5  Today
most freight travels under these rates.6 A third type of rate is the "all-
commodity rate" or "all-freight rate," whereby a single rate is applied to a
1For the early theory and history of freight classification, see Western Classi-
fication No. 51, ICC No. 9, 25 I.C.C. 442, 451-59 (1912) ; WAY, ELEMENTS OF FREIGHT
TRAFFIC 76-83 (1956).
2 See, e.g., Thurber v. New York Cent & H.R.R.R., 3 I.C.C. 473, 500-01 (1890);
WYMAN, RAILROAD RATE REGULATION 458-59 (2d ed. 1915).
336 Stat. 544 (1910), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(6) (1958).
4 See text accompanying notes 35-49 infra.
5 E.g., The Mississippi River Case, 28 I.C.C. 47, 63 (1913).
,GFAIR & WILLIAMS, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION 376 (rev. ed. 1959);
PEGRUM, TRANSPORTATION: ECONOMICS AND PUBLIc POLICY 236 (1963).
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carload of more than one commodity regardless of classifications.7 This
rate has allowed the railroads to compete more effectively for traffic of
freight forwarders and other large shippers of miscellaneous freight by
offering a carload rate for mixed shipments lower than the total of ap-
plicable less-than-carload rates of the railroad and of competing carriers,
particularly truckers. 8 Another purpose was to encourage shippers to
consolidate less-than-carload mixed shipments into carload shipments.9
Apparently to assure the ICC that this rate would apply only to genuine
mixtures,'0 the railroads generally specified that not more than a certain
percentage of any one commodity may be included."
In 1959 the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad initiated a
system of all-commodity rates without the requirement of a mixed group.
It had lost much of its westbound traffic to motor carriers '2 and to trailer-
on-flat-car (TOFC) service operated by other railroads. Unable to employ
TOFC service because of equipment and clearance difficulties and plagued
by many empty boxcars moving west, it devised this plan not merely to
compete for mixed shipments or to encourage carload shipments, but
primarily to compete for all shipments, 13 both mixed and straight. For
freight movement from New England to the Chicago-St. Louis area, the
7 See, e.g., DAGGET & CARTER, THE STRUCTURE OF TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILROAD
RATES 30 (1947) ; HEALY, EcoNomics OF TRANSPORTATION IN AMERICA 232 (1940).
8 See Loading of Multiple Cars on Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 238 I.C.C. 792, 794
(1940); BIGHAM & ROBERTS, TRANSPORTATION PRINCIPI.ES AND PROBLEMS 381 (2d
ed. 1952); NATIONAL REsoURcES PLANNING BOARD, TRANSPORTATION AND NATIONAL
POLICY 105 (1942) ; note 20 infra.
9 See All Commodities From New England to Chicago & St Louis, 315 I.C.C.
419, 422 (1961). Such consolidation results in more expeditious and economical service.
See Consolidated Classification Case, 54 I.C.C. 1, 18 (1919) ; AUERBACH & NATHAN-
SON, THE FEDERAL. REGULATION OF TRANSPORTATION 876 (1953); MORTON & Moss-
MAN, INDUSTRIAL TRAmc MANAGEMENT 97-98 (1954).
10 Originally, carload class rates applied only to carloads of one commodity, and
individual commodities in a mixed carload moved under less-than-carload class rates.
The ICC then recommended the adoption of classification rule 10, see Consolidated
Classification Case, 54 I.C.C. 1, 16-19 (1919) ; COLQUiTT, THE ART AND DEvELOPmENT
oF FREIGHT CLASSIFICATION 117-18 (1956), labeled the "mixing rule," to permit a
special use of carload class rates for mixed carloads. See generally COLQUITT, op.
cit. supra at 117-28; WAY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 241-51. A further concession
by the ICC to promote mixed carload shipments was to permit the use of all-
commodity rates for such shipments instead of carload or less-than-carload class
rates. See id. at 247. There had been some doubt, however, whether the ICC would
permit the use of all-commodity rates for straight carloads. Apparently the railroads
were not willing to subject proposed all-commodity rates to invalidation by applying
them to straight carloads as well as mixed carloads.
11 See BIGHAM & ROBERTS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 381; MORTON & MOSSMAN,
op. cit. supra note 9, at 98. Such a specification prevents "an abuse of provisions
for mixtures by a shipper by the simple expedient of throwing one or two extraneous
articles into a truckload or volume shipment of a single kind of commodity and billing
it as a mixture." CoLQuITT, op. cit. supra note 10, at 119.
12 Many of the commodities have been classified and rated according to the value
of the commodity. Thus, truckers have been able to compete in a particularly effec-
tive manner for westbound shipments of relatively high-rated manufactured goods.
See text accompanying notes 41-43 infra.
'3 See Brief for Plaintiff Railroads, p. 7; Joint Brief of the United States of
America and the Interstate Commerce Commission, p. 45.
CASE COMMENTS
rates apply to straight carload shipments as well as mixtures and are
lower than the existing carload class or commodity rates which otherwise
would have governed. The system provides for a rate per hundred pounds
for each 10,000 pound increment of minimum carload weights from 20,000
pounds to 70,000 pounds.1 4 A lower rate is provided for each successive
increment, which enables denser items to be shipped at lower rates. The
rates apply to commodities which can be carried in a boxcar, except those
with high risk of loss or damage, such as perishables and explosives. 15
Faced with such reduced rates, three other railroads instituted similar
systems.16 A group of motor carriers protested to the ICC,17 which held
that since the rates apply to straight shipments and are lower than existing
class rates, the plan renders useless the present structure of class rates,
violating the section 1(6) requirement of just and reasonable classifica-
tions of property,' 8 and is "a destructive competitive practice in contraven-
tion of the national transportation policy." '9 On appeal,20 the district
court set aside the Commission's order to cancel the rates, holding that
section 1(6) merely requires the establishment of a system of class rates as
a maximum to be charged to shippers and does not prevent competitively-
compelled, compensatory rate reductions.21 In so holding it criticized the
14 See All Commodities From New England to Chicago & St. Louis, 313 I.C.C.
275, 279 table 3, 280 table 4, rev'd, 315 I.C.C. 419 (1961).
15 Other exceptions are livestock, military, or scientific equipment. All Com-
modities From New England to Chicago & St. Louis, 315 I.C.C. 419 n2 (1961).
16 They are the Boston and Maine Railroad, the Maine Central Railroad Company,
and the New York Central Railroad Company.
17 All Commodities From New England to Chicago & St. Louis, 315 I.C.C. 419,
reversing 313 I.C.C. 275 (1961) [hereinafter first ICC decision cited 313 I.C.C. at
appropriate page; the second cited 315 I.C.C. at appropriate page].
18 Id. at 423.
'9 Ibid.
It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy of the Con-
gress to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transpor-
tation subject to the provisions of this Act so administered as to recognize
and preserve the inherent advantages of each . . . to encourage the establish-
ment and maintenance of reasonable charges for transportation services,
without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair
or destructive competitive practices . . . . All of the provisions of this Act
shall be administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the above
declaration of policy.
54 Stat. 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C. Preamble (1958). (Emphasis added.)
20 In addition to the three railroads instituting the system, note 16 supra, fifteen
other railroads, including those employing TOFC, joined as appellants. Brief for
Plaintiff Railroads, p. 65. Eleven motor carriers intervened as defendants. Brief
for Intervening Defendants, p. 20.
From the resultant dispute between the railroads and the trucks, it is evident that
the shift in the freight market which the system was designed to effectuate, text
accompanying note 13 supra, was not from TOFC railroads to non-TOFC railroads,
but from motor carriers to railroads. The railroads wanted to use low-level all-
commodity rates competitively not only for TOFC, Cooper-Jarrett, Inc. v. United
States, 226 F. Supp. 318 (W.D. Mo. 1964), by which railroads could only move a
limited amount of traffic, but more important, for the great number of idle boxcars
possessed by the railroads.
21 Instant case at 374. The present court was in substantial agreement with the
dissenting member of the ICC.
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Commission for impliedly upholding the so-called "value of service" theory
of ratemaking.22 The court also held that no unfair or destructive com-
petitive practice was involved because the rates "enable the railroads 'to
respond to competition by asserting whatever inherent advantages of cost
and service they possessed.' " New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. United
States, 221 F. Supp. 370 (D. Conn. 1963), prob. juris. noted sub norn.
All States Freight, Inc. v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 84 Sup. Ct. 1122
(1964).
Prior to the passage of section 1(6), the ICC had complete power to
set aside unreasonable rates applicable to a particular classification.
24
However, carriers often discriminated between commodities by manipulat-
ing the composition of classifications without any change in the rate itself, '
and there was doubt as to the power of the Commission to determine the
reasonableness of classifications.2 6  Section 1(6), creating a duty on car-
riers to establish just and reasonable classifications and prohibiting unjust
and unreasonable classifications, was designed to alleviate these doubts by
giving the Commission the same power over the contents of classifications
as it had over rates applied to classifications, 27 thereby insuring that it had
complete power to determine whether the final charge was reasonable. In
the present case the Commission interpreted the term "classifications" as
requiring an effective system of class rates,28 while the district court held
that it only required maintenance of a system as a declaration of maximum
rates.
2 9
Section 1(6) must be construed in light of the subsequent unforeseen
development of rate patterns,3 0 especially the supersession of class rates by
2 2
1d. at 375-76; accord, 315 I.C.C. at 428-33 (dissenting opinion).
23 Instant case at 376.
24 Act to Regulate Commerce, ch. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
2545 CONG. REc. 5142 (1910) (Representative Russell), quoted note 32 infra.
26 Myer v. Cleveland, C., C. & S.L. Ry., 9 I.C.C. 78, 86 (1901) (dictum);
JUDSON, THE LAW OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE §209 (1st ed. 1905); 45 CONG. REC.
5142 (1910) (Representative Russell), quoted note 32 infra; S. REP. No. 355 pt. I,
61st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1910).
27 See 45 CONG. REc. 5142 (1910) (Representative Russell), quoted note 32
infra; H.R. REP. No. 923, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1910) (quoting recommendations
of President Taft in his special message to Congress on January 7, 1910) ; id. at
10-11; S. REP. No. 355 pt. I, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1910); S. REP. No. 355 pt. II,
61st Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1910).
28 315 I.C.C. at 423.
29 See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
30 Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944) (concurring opinion),
aff'd sub norn. Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945); see OPPENHEImI, THE
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY AND INTER-CARRIER COmPETITIVE RATES 3542
(1945).
"Congress should not be expected exclusively to fill in the interstices of language
or to provide a glossary of meanings for each word it employs." Id. at 38.
"Emphasis should be laid . . . upon the necessity for appraisal of the purposes as a
whole of Congress in analyzing the meaning of clauses or sections of general acts."
United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 544 (1940) (dictum).
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commodity and all-commodity ratesP.3 Although the statutory language
seems to require classifications, the sole purpose of section 1(6) was to
give the ICC more flexibility in combating discrimination; 32 it was not
designed to rigidify the rate structure by requiring maintenance of class
rates of any kind. Since Congress did not consider the merits of particular
rate structures, section 1(6) should not be read to require class rates. The
only reason for "classifications" is to facilitate ratemaking by avoiding the
almost impossible task of making and publishing a separate rate for each
article.33 Thus, the requirement of "just and reasonable classifications"
is merely a requirement that commodities be grouped together for rate pur-
poses on any rational basis.
34
In testing the railroads' rate structures the Commission has not
grouped commodities on any one controlling standard;3 5 it has considered
value, cost, and demand factors and desirability to encourage or discourage
movement of the commodity for the public welfare.30 At first, railroads
established rates barely above out-of-pocket costs for high-value com-
modities manufactured in urban areas where they were faced with com-
petition from other carriers, and recouped these revenue deficits by charging
bulk commodities, produced in agricultural regions where railroads had
31 See authorities cited note 6 .rpra. This growth of commodity and all-com-
modity rates, approved by the ICC and courts with the knowledge of transportation
experts in Congress, concurrent with comprehensive congressional action in the trans-
portation rate area-the Transportation Acts of 1920, 1933, 1940, and 1958-seems
to indicate tacit approval of these new rates and of a flexible rate structure. "[W]hen
action has been taken upon a statute by the legislature, and where a practical and
contemporaneous interpretation was called to its attention, the failure of the legisla-
ture to change the interpretation should be regarded as presumptive evidence of its
correctness." 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5109, at 525
(3d ed. Horack 1943).
32 I was told . . . that the shipper can be extorted from; he can be made
to pay an unjust rate just as well through classification as he can through the
fixing of a rate. The carriers can put an article in one classification, subject
to a given rate, and if the Interstate Commerce Commission sees fit to declare
that rate unreasonable, and reduce it, declaring what shall be a reasonable
rate to take its place, the carrying corporation can obtain the same benefit
and put the shipper under the same disadvantage by simply changing the
classification of the article. Heretofore the commission has held it had not
been granted power to regulate classifications. So that by specific enactment
in the bill we have vested in the commission the right to regulate not only
rates, but classifications.
45 CONG. REC. 5142 (1910) (Representative Russell) ; see id. at 5140-42.
33 See WAY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 75-76.
34 This principle is commonly stated in the following manner: "analogous articles
should ordinarily take the same rates." LocKLIN, EcoNomics oF TRANSPORTATION
409 (5th ed. 1960) ; see cases cited in COLQuiTT, op. cit. ztpra note 10, at 79-80.
The determination of analogous commodities is only the first step in a two-step
process of determining the final charge to the shipper, grouping and rating. The
concepts used to determine which commodities are to be grouped together for the
same rating are also used to determine the rate differentials between nonanalogous
commodities.
35 See LocKaIN, op. cit. mipra note 34, at 431; Note, 15 Mica. L. REv. 478 (1917);
Note, 15 U. CHL L. Rxv. 177, 186 (1947).
36 See generally LOCKLI N, op. cit. supra note 34, at 410-31; PEGRUM, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 228-31.
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greater monopolistic control, a rate well above fully-allocated cost.37  Subse-
quent regulation completely reversed the burdens of shippers; 3s generally
termed "value of service," 39 the regulation was based upon a factor some-
times labelled "value of the commodity," and substantially decreased the
rates on bulk commodities while increasing them on high-value commodities
in a manner similar to an excise tax.40
Since "monopoly . . . has become the exception rather than the rule
in transportation . . . ," 41 the "value of the commodity" factor appears
to have lost its main purpose of preventing high, monopolistic rates on bulk
commodities. It forces the railroads to carry certain bulk commodities at
less than out-of-pocket costs,42 and other commodities at unnecessarily high
rates. 3 The present case is a good example of manufacturers having
switched from railroads to trucks because of outmoded rates unrealistic for
today's intense competition. The "value of the commodity" standard should
37 See MEYER, PECK, STETASON & ZWICK, THE EcONomIcS OF ColTPEITION IN
THE TRASPORTATION INDUSTRIES 5-8 (1959).
38 The political power of the agricultural producers and the fact that competition
tended to become destructive for the railroads led to this early regulation. Ibid.
39 Id. at 8.
4 0 Ibid. At the time, this type of ratemaking had many proponents, see, e.g., 1
ICC ANN. REP. 31 (1887), but today it has much opposition, see, e.g., LocKLIN, op.
cit. mpra note 34, at 149-50.
The term "value of service" seems to have generated much confusion recently
because many commentators have come to use it in reference to "demand for service"
factors. See, e.g., id. at 142-44. A possible reason for this confusion is that some
economists believe that the "value of the commodity" is a demand factor. They
argue that high-value commodities more easily absorb increases in rates without a
significant change in the volume of traffic. See, e.g., MEYER, op. cit. supra note 37,
at 173. Others, however, assert that there is a significant difference between "value
of the commodity" and "demand for service." See, e.g., LocKLIN, op. cit. Supra note
34, at 145, 421 & cases cited in n.72; PEGRUm, op. cit. mspra note 6, at 230.
Apparently, the court's assault on the "value of service" standard, see text
accompanying note 22 supra, is directed at the early "value of the commodity" factor.
The court asserted that the
principle was useful in the early years of the Interstate Commerce Act in
requiring the more prosperous East to assist in the development of railroads
and commercial and agricultural enterprises in the undeveloped West at a
time When the existing railroads were powerful monopolies.
Instant case at 375.
In condemning the ICC for preserving the "value of service" standard by its
insistence on effective class rates, the court lost sight of the numerous "cost of
service" and "demand for service" considerations which constitute an important part
of the present class rate structures.
At any rate, the term "value of service" should be avoided because of its recent
ambiguity.
41 MEYER, op. cit. mpra note 37, at 13.
4 2 Id. at 175.
The standard may be justified to some extent in reflecting the cost of the service
because the insurance cost is greater for higher valued commodities. See LocaLNr,
op. cit. mpra note 34, at 145.
43 Intensive competition for high-value commodities have given the manufacturers
a great number of alternative methods for moving their goods and have made them
particularly averse to paying high rates. MEYER, op. cit. mpra note 37, at 13.
be only a minor consideration in modern ratemaking, and should not be used
to defeat the proposed plan.
A second standard governing ratemaking is the demand for the trans-
portation service: the effect of rate changes on the volume of shipment.4L A
commodity's ability to bear higher rates is dependent upon the degree of
competition for its transport.4 5 In the present case it is conceivable that
because of the intensive competition of trucks and other railroads, no item
included within the plan could have moved sufficiently at rates higher
than the established TOFC all-commodity rates. Movement under the plan
indicates compliance with the demand standard of grouping or classifying. 6
A third ratemaking factor has been the cost of the service, which is
based upon the efficiency of the carrier in performing the service. Primary
sources for cost differences between commodities are loading characteristics,
susceptibility to loss or damage, amount of the carrier's liability, volume
and regularity of movement, type of equipment required, and special
services.47 To the extent that the New Haven's proposed plan ignores cost
differences in transporting individual commodities by boxcar, it violates the
"cost of service" standard.48 However, the plan is not completely devoid of
cost justification; dxtremely high-cost items are excluded and the system
in itself represents an administrative cost saving.
49
Which of these or other considerations should be paramount in deter-
mining whether the proposed rates bear the proper relationship between
commodities required by section 1(6) is an issue that should be decided by
the ICC. It should then determine whether the plan meets the selected
standard. In the present case, however, the Commission rested its deci-
sion on a misconstruction of section 1(6), without considering appropriate
standards. Therefore, the district court should have remanded for findings
based upon a proper construction of section 1(6).
The Commission's second ground for invalidating the proposed plan
is that it is an "unfair or destructive competitive practice" under the national
transportation policy as set forth in the Preamble of the Interstate Com-
merce Act.50 In setting aside the Commission's order, the district court
44 See id. at 170-72. See generally LocKLix, op. cit. supra note 34, at 417-29, for
a number of "demand for service" considerations.
45 Competition between transportation services increases the availability of sub-
stitutes for the shipper and increases the elasticity of demand for each service. Cf.
GUTHRSE, EcoNomics 256 (1957).
46 315 I.C.C. at 421; 313 I.C.C. at 277-78.
4 7 LocxLiN, op. cit. supra note 34, at 410-17.
48 A separation and grouping of high-cost commodities, see note 15 supra and
accompanying text, even might have been a sufficient operational classification to
meet the Commission's requirement of effective class rates. Text accompanying
note 28 infra.
49 It eliminates the expense of classifying and weighing each article in a mixture.
See Colquitt, Classification Elements: Mixed Truckloads or Mixed Volume Ship-
inents, Transport Topics, Dec. 6, 1954, p. 18, col. 1.
50 Note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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relied on a test propounded in an earlier New Haven case,51 which has
since been vacated by the Supreme Court 52 in the Seatrain decision.5 3 The
Supreme Court defined the test as being a prohibition against one carrier
impairing the inherent advantage of another carrier.54 A possible example
of such an impairment given by the Court was setting a rate lower than
fully allocated costs "which would force a competitor with a cost advantage
on particular transportation to establish an unprofitable rate in order to
attract traffic." 55 Although the Court left the ICC free to make its own
determination of "inherent advantage" and "impairment" 51 and disclaimed
any attempt to do so itself,57 it strongly implied that the findings must be
specific.5s
In the present case the Commission set forth a chart comparing out-of-
pocket costs, fully-distributed costs, and the applicable proposed rate for
each increment of minimum weight.59 Nothing was said about which
commodities contributed to the cost figures. The ICC concluded that "the
proposed rates more than cover fully distributed costs." 60 On reconsidera-
tion the Commission revealed that the basis for the original cost evidence
of record was average eastern-district costs.61  From this evidence the
Commission this time concluded that the rates exceed out-of-pocket costs
"and in most instances make a substantial contribution to overhead." 62
This cost evidence does not contain the specific findings required by
Seatrain. Merely because the proposed rates exceed average fully dis-
tributed costs does not necessarily mean that the proposed rates exceed
51 The test defined an "unfair or destructive competitive practice" as:
a practice which would destroy a competing mode of transportation by setting
rates so low as to be hurtful to the proponent as well as his competitor or
so low as to deprive the competitor of the "inherent advantage" of being the
low-cost carrier.
Instant case at 376 (quoting New York, N.H. & H.RR. v. United States, 199 F.
Supp. 635, 642 (D. Conn. 1961), vacated sub norn. ICC v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
372 U.S. 744 (1963)); accord, Cooper-Jarrett, Inc. v. United States, 226 F. Supp.
318, 325-26 (W.D. Mo. 1964); St Louis-S.F. Ry. v. United States, 207 F. Supp.
293, 298 (E.D. Mo. 1962) ; Missouri P.R.R. v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 629, 634
(E.D. Mo. 1962); Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 584, 586 (E.D.
Pa. 1962).
52 ICC v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 372 U.S. 744 (1963).
53 77 HA~v. L. Ray. 176 (1963).
54 372 U.S. at 759.
55 Ibid.
56 Id. at 760-61.
57 Id. at 760.
58 See 77 H.Av. L. REV. 176, 177 (1963) ; cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80
(1943).
59 313 I.C.C. at 280.
60 Ibid.
61315 I.C.C. at 421.
62 Ibid. The Commission apparently did not deem this finding controlling because
it held that the plan is, nevertheless, an "unfair or destructive competitive practice."
Id. at 423.
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the fully distributed costs of straight carloads of each commodity included
in the plan, or even that they exceed the individual out-of-pocket costs.63
For some commodities in which a competitor has a cost advantage, the
proposed rates may be below fully-allocated costs and thus may be a
destructive competitive practice under Seatrain.64 The Commission in
the present case did not determine whether the rates were below fully
allocated costs of individual commodities, and it did not make any findings
of cost advantage.0 It thus appears that the case should have been re-
manded to the ICC for further findings on this issue.
63The Commission did make the latter conclusion. Id. at 421.
04 See text accompanying note 55 supra.
65 According to Seatrain, the carrier proposing the rate change bears the burden
of proving it to be just and reasonable from the standpoint of its own revenue require-
ments. Then the protesting party has the burden of showing relative cost advantage.
But, "when such an issue is raised, each carrier should bring forward the data relating
to its own cost that are required for resolution of the issue." ICC v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 372 U.S. 744, 760 n.12 (1963).
